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Abstract
This thesis investigates the role of settlers in maintaining settlement in Canada. I
problematize settler bodies to deliberate on their potential for performing decolonization.
My discussion seeks to complicate theoretical approaches that position the ontoepistemological stance of the settler as their impediment to decolonizing action. Drawing
from the fields of phenomenology and affect theory, I discuss habit formation in bodies. I
use case studies that discuss settler-Indigenous land relations to ground these theories of
habit. I look to Indigenous leaders, artists and scholars, who offer valuable insights into the
habituations of settlement as an institutionalized arrangement and a mode of behavior. I
argue that settlement is a structure that emerges through settler bodies by way of their
everyday being in the world. Performing settlement is therefore a habitual tendency for the
settler who knows themselves in the world. A program for decolonization must address
these habitual faculties beyond inducing an epistemological shift. I examine and confront
settlers’ habitual tendencies to consider how they can shift their bodily habits and why they
might want to take up the task of decolonization. I conclude with an initial framework for
bringing settlers to the difficult work of confronting the legacy of colonialism and forging
respectful treaty relations with Canada’s Indigenous sovereign partners.

Keywords
Merleau-Ponty; Critical Phenomenology; Phenomenology; The Habit Body; Settler
Colonial Studies, Post-Colonial Studies; The Settler Habit Body; Settler-Indigenous Land
Relations in Canada; Decolonizing Settlers.
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Summary for Lay Audience
Contemporary settlement in Canada is not an equitable arrangement that sufficiently
recognizes and respects the sovereignties and treaty rights of Indigenous groups. Many
settler Canadians remain unaware that the land they live on and the national economy they
participate in is bound up with colonialism. Contrary to what has been implied in our
national discourses of apology and multiculturalism, colonialism in Canada is not a past
event. Treaties that were signed at the inception of the Canadian state were agreements
meant to forge fair use of lands. Over the course of Canada’s history, those agreements
were not upheld by the settler state. The current system of settlement was built upon these
inequitable relations, which means contemporary settlers continue to benefit from a
structure that has never sufficiently been restructured.
The question of how we can bring about more equitable relations is often difficult for
settlers to confront. In addition to the financial implications of steps like land repatriation,
how settlers feel about returning lands to Indigenous groups often deters them from action.
While some have argued that settlers need to be more open-minded, I argue that settlement
is in the bodily habits of settlers. These habits come in the form of work, play, and general
day-to-day activities that bring us success within the social an economic structure that is
settlement. It is through these activities that settlers feel settlement, such as the sense of
pride, security or insecurity, and/or the anticipation of future happiness. This thesis looks
to the sensing and emotional faculties of settlers to understand the ways that their habits of
settlement can be re-directed towards creating new habits of decolonization. I draw from
the fields of phenomenology and affect theory to discuss habit formation in bodies. I look
to specific case studies that discuss settler-Indigenous land relations to ground these
theories of habit. I also look to Indigenous leaders, artists and scholars, who offer valuable
insights into the habituations of settlement as a structure and a mode of behavior. I conclude
by offering a basic framework for bringing settlers to the difficult work of decolonization.
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Introduction
My introduction to the theory and praxis of researching settlement in Canada came
to me in the form of two settler scholars whose work changed the course of my studies.
The first is Amber Dean, whose writing on disappeared Indigenous women and what
defines whose lives and deaths matter in the context of colonial Canada reshaped my
understanding of systemic violence. It is from Dean’s work that I became attuned to the
need for intersectional analyses for interrogating the particularities of institutionalized
oppression, especially when it concerns the lives, disappearances, and deaths of Indigenous
peoples. The second is Eva Mackey, whose ethnographic work I largely draw upon in this
thesis to contemplate further the problem she terms “settler certainty,” which she defines
as the ontological certainty of settler entitlement to lands that is based on the myth of solo
settler sovereignty.1 While Dean’s work helped me make the division between the lived
conditions of settler and Indigenous peoples perceivable, Mackey’s insights gave me the
sense for how multiculturalism and Indigeneity are utilized by the state in interconnected
ways to serve the outcomes of settlement. These two scholars brought me to understand
colonialism as a system in which I was embedded and that I benefitted from in ways that
were distinct from others. It is from their work that I began to feel certain about wanting
things to be different.
I write about the knowing I acquired from reading Dean and Mackey’s works
because it is indicative of a much bigger and problematic issue in settler culture. Why is it
that I learned about my privilege in Canadian society from two settler scholars when the
works of Indigenous scholars, leaders, and artists who have taken up the task of resistance
and critique have always been available? It is not as if I was unaware that Indigenous
perspectives and resistance to settlement was present in my world. To focus on one
example –although there have been many – I have vivid memories of watching the Oka
protests broadcast on the news when I was 14 years of age. At that time, I was very
uncertain as to why a golf course should be such a big deal. While I thought the developers
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were aggressive, I also felt that perhaps the “Mohawk” should just give up on the spectacle
they were creating before they got hurt.2 Development happened everywhere and felt
inevitable, which meant the protestors were being incredibly provocative by demanding
otherwise.
Clearly, I was aware that there was a settler problem because I could see and hear
about that problem on my television, in my family home, and as it was discussed in my
social circles. These conversations were – as far as I can recall at present – with other
settlers and they consisted of criticisms or support for the protestors’ claims, mainly to
bolster the opinions of all who wanted to take up space in the lively debate. I wonder now
how much of the protestors I actually heard after they were filtered through news editing
and the opinions of those around me.
The problem then was not that I did not hear and see Indigenous resistance and
critique. The problem was perhaps that I only heard and saw a version of what they were
saying, and I was perplexed about the facts surrounding the crisis. I very quickly learned
that implying the protestors were wrong was the path of least resistance because fewer
people in my community became angry about that stance and the ones who agreed with it
calmly assured everyone that the government would shut it down. I was deeply frightened
by the idea of said shut down and what it might mean for the protestors, but the confidence
of the adults surrounding me made me feel better about finding a resolution. On the other
hand, the people who did agree with the protesters became outraged; they would shout
about facts that did not comply with what I understood to be correct about settlerIndigenous land relations. As a western European, third-generation white settler whose
family found their roots in Canada by way of building, buying and developing land, it
seemed impossible to me that Indigenous people should have a say in how land is used. In
other words, what was happening at Oka was confusing and a topic that was best to avoid
with a nod and a shrug. Although I was fearful for the protestors, what they were fighting
about did not appear to affect my life directly.
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I turn to a description of my experience of the Oka crisis because it communicates
the limits of my ability at that time to intellectually comprehend the settler problem.
Looking back, I might contemplate why I did not ask more questions to know more about
the situation in hopes that perhaps I could have taken a more active role in the matter, even
if that role was expressed just amongst my family, friends, and teachers. But to assume all
I needed was better knowledge of the issue and how to bring that argument into a
conversation was to overlook the feelings that kept me from acquiring that knowledge and
expressing it.
Most notably, my feelings of disorientation caused me to turn away from digging
deeper, and I approached conversations regarding the matter by saying as little as possible,
nodding and shrugging in repetition. Eventually, my body took up the habit of avoiding
settler-Indigenous issues by walking away from conversations or putting my attention
elsewhere because these events felt too difficult to confront. These instances were perhaps
what Alia Al-Saji describes as “events for which we cannot account from within our
instituted system of meaning.”3 This particular inassimilable event, the one in which a
settler must interpret Indigenous resistance, is not a random event to be conflated with other
difficult encounters. As Al-Saji points out, the event is understood relationally to instituted
systems of hierarchical relations and are thus bolstered by different oppressive apparatuses.
This is to say that my bodily attitude towards the Oka crisis would not have been the same
as if I had, for example, witnessed a feminist protest. Furthermore, my reaction was also
likely different from the bodily attitude of an Indigenous person observing the
demonstration. The way that I responded was therefore specifically a settler response to a
problem that felt incomprehensible, and my inclination to turn away became habitual
because I turned away in repetition instead of making myself open to the problem.
This thesis presents a phenomenology of the settler habit body to problematize the
ways that settlers experience and perform settlement. I am interested in locating and

Alia Al-Saji, “Critical-Ethical,” 11. “These are [inassimilable] events for which we cannot account from within our
instituted system of meaning – events that reveal, if we are open to them, the fractures in the coherence of the visual
field.”
3
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interrogation the affective and bodily habitual faculties of the settler that keep them from
turning towards the challenges of living settlement. More specifically, settlement, as it
exists today, is not an equitable arrangement towards Indigenous groups that recognizes
and respects their sovereignties and treaty rights. I aim to explore in this thesis how the
habitual tendencies of settlers bring settlement into existence, and what seeing settlement
as habit means for changing the existing structure. But before I can unpack the concept of
the settler habit body, it is necessary to introduce the habit body concept and situate its
emergence in the field of phenomenology.
While this thesis draws largely from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the habit
body, habit, as it relates to consciousness, was not initially emergent as bodily
comportment as Merleau-Ponty argues. In David Hume’s work, habits are considered a
mental activity used to justify causality. While causality was once thought to concern
objective features in the world, Hume’s work showed causality to be an experiential
process in which we make meaning that constitutes our consciousness. 4 For Hume, there
is a difference between our inner perception – how we sense our inner selves – and
introspection – how we reflect on our mental states. While inner perception is apparent to
us because we are living it, introspection is highly complex and fallible. As Dermot Moran
describes Hume’s position, “We cannot observe our own mental states while occupying
them. Introspection can only distort the phenomena it seeks to study, we cannot observe
our anger, without modifying it in some way.”5 Our inner state, as we move through it,
cannot be located or found as an object for analysis because we are experiencing it. Hume,
therefore, viewed reason as ill-equipped to justify causality, which he argues is habits of
expectation. As Michael Hammond, Jane Howarth and Russell Keat describe, “Hume
argued that one’s experience of causal connections should be analyzed in terms of the
association (constant conjunction) of similar pairs of experiences in the past, built up so
that one acquires habits of expectation (habitualities) that a particular type of event (labeled
‘effect’) will follow another type of event (labelled ‘cause’).”6 Causality is therefore
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constructed when we imminently make meaning of the event, and what we understand as
causal relations are actually our habitual tendencies to expect certain outcomes.
Edmund Husserl, much like Hume, thought of habituation as bound up with the
ways that the subject encounters the world. For Husserl, the subject would not be a subject
if they did not acquire habits.7 Habits are what the unified self has as its history or its
genesis. The universals governing the genesis, as Husserl describes them, question how
one is the subject they are and how they remain the same subject while they encounter new
experiences.8 These two principals of genesis more specifically deal with “what is
presented in experience (passive) and what is made of what is presented (active).”9 While
passive encounters with objects are sensed experiences that can be described
phenomenologically, active encounters are instances when we re-arrange physical objects
and become productively active. In both cases, we rely on what we know, our habituations,
in the encounter.
Husserl examined the features of habituations and how they are acquired to develop
his understanding concerning the laws of association that preside over habits of
expectation. While he saw Hume’s laws of association to be empirical discoveries, he
viewed his own to be eidetic because, they describe “a realm of the ‘innate’ a priori, without
which an ego as such is unthinkable.”10 In which case, principal associations do not operate
causally the way that Hume understood, wherein the meaning of events are imminently
created. As Hammond et al. explain, “They provide the basis of all experience, including
experience of causal connections. Any appeal to experience on the basis of which one could
discern causality in operation would be an appeal to experience which itself is structured
by these principals of association.”11 In other words, we can only recognize succession,
contingency, and resemblance if we are already engaging our habituations. The universals
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governing genesis are already at work, shaping our perception of the event as it is
happening.
While Hume and Husserl’s work on habitualities situated habit as theoretical and
cognitive acts, Martin Heidegger emphasized the ordinary lived experiences of the body in
the world. Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world sought to complicate the
assumptions of modern materialism, which focused on the ways that objects in the world
can be theoretically examined by disembodied subjects. Being-in-the-world was a
substitute term for the divisive terms subject, object, consciousness and the world.
Heidegger brought attention to the mundane everyday activities of living that allow
theorization to be possible to work from the “primordial experiences in which we achieved
our first ways of determining the nature of Being—the ways which have guided us ever
since.”12 His work is described by Moran as “anti-Cartesian, anti-subjectivist, anti-dualist,
and anti-intellectualist.”13 Distancing his work from the Husserlian concepts of
phenomenology, which positioned cognition as the connection between humans and their
world, Heidegger sought to free the thought of being from the philosophical propositions
that he felt Husserl gave him to see with and instead cultivate a “pure naïveté.”14 He argues
at the beginning of Being and Time that phenomenology is “opposed to all free-floating
constructions and accidental findings,” and is instead a form of “self-evidence.”15 To be in
the world, according to Heidegger, means the body is not separate parts – arms and legs –
nor separate from the mind, but rather, it is to be an integrated bodily unit, situated in a
specific time and space. As Eliot Deutsch has phrased it, “I am ‘embodied’ in the sense …
that I am my body.”16
Human existence, the body “being there” (Dasein), became for Heidegger a project
that saw habit in a negative light. More specifically, he understands habituations to be a
pre-reflective way of enacting social expressions that lack individual intelligibility, and as
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such, they express “an undifferentiated kind of intelligibility.”17 The individual, unaware
of her actions in the present moment acts out what is in her but not really hers. According
to James McGuirk’s reading of habituation in Heidegger, “Habitual ways of being and
acting, as such, distract, uproot and alienate Dasein from being-in-the-world by dissolving
individual Dasein into an inauthentic self-forgetfulness or an amorphous ‘they’ that is
everyone and no-one.”18 While Heidegger’s take on habituation moves it from the
cognitive and theoretical frame of Hume and Husserl into a complex being in the world
that undermines mind-body dualism, it does not see habits as useful for understanding
embodiment and consciousness.
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty finds in habituation a certain
productive quality for understanding the importance of the body’s being in the world. As
McGuirk describes, for Merleau-Ponty, “habits are, in fact, crucial to the constitution of
the individual as individual and to her constitution as knower of the world.” 19 This
rendering of habits undermines the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity and instead
shows subjectivity and the body to be inextricably linked. By way of this link, subjects
become naturalized or objectified. Habits in this sense, “enable[s] us to think the
objectification process.”20 Subjectivity, for Merleau-Ponty, cannot be understood unless it
is embodied and apprehended as constantly enmeshed with the phenomenal sensing body.
His term the habit body is therefore not a doing away with consciousness, but a way of
comprehending how consciousness comes into being.
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the habit body is useful for problematizing settler
bodies because it supports a theorization of settlement as an embodied structure that is
habitually taken up by settlers to create colonizing conditions in Canada. Seen through this
lens, settlement is not a final destination but a constructed and thus malleable way of being
in the world. Habits are maintained, to shift habits requires the body to do differently. Many
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critiques of settler colonialism consider the ontological stance of settlers to be the main
impediment to decolonizing action in the material world. I argue that this perspective
delegitimizes the role that settler bodies being in the world plays in formulating their
worldviews. The consciousness of the settler, who they know themselves to be, is a
continuous construction of engagement with the world. This means that to know oneself
as not the colonizer requires settler bodies to take up ways of extending into the world that
are decolonizing. Intellectual or conceptual adjustments are not enough to change the
current structure of settlement, which is at present an embodied, material, perceptual and
thus affective structure that shapes the consciousness and expectations of settlers.
Addressing the complexities of such a structure requires the work of a critical
phenomenology of settlerness.
My investigation of the settler habit body works through a critical phenomenology
methodology. Classical phenomenology brings us to the transcendental ego to understand
there is no meaningful experience without someone doing the experiencing, and it brings
us beyond understanding ourselves as a bare cogito “I think.” As Lisa Guenther describes,
“I think” is “in its most basic formulation, a relation or orientation of the thinker to the
thought…I do not just think, I think thoughts, feel feelings, remember memories, and so
forth.”21 While classical phenomenology illuminates the transcendental structures that
shape our perception and habituations, it does not account for the ways that historical and
social structures shape our experiential events.
While I find Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the habit body to be a fantastic starting
point, it is insufficient in itself to properly account for the lineage construction that is
settlement in contemporary Canada. More specifically, his reading of the habit body is
essential for understanding the formation of habit, but not necessarily the formation of
settlement as habit. To proceed past these limitations, I look to critical phenomenology
theorists, mainly Helen Ngo, Sara Ahmed and Alia Al-Saji, to further explicate the
influences and pressures that settlers endure under the hegemonic structures of settlement.
I read these theorists in coordination with analytical and ethnographic work from settler
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colonial studies scholars, as well as Indigenous leaders, thinkers, artists and scholars, who
offer valuable insights into the habituations of settlement as a structure and a mode of
settler behavior. Most importantly, I ground this work in the Canadian context to situate
decolonization in the particulars of Canada’s version of settlement. I am invested in the
work of decolonization in Canada as a settler scholar who aims to grapple with
conceptualizing my own role in restructuring settlement towards more equitable ends.
While this work is not a comprehensive critical phenomenology of settlerness, I aim to
begin conceptualizing decolonization by problematizing the settler body within a
descriptive and theory forward approach.

The settler habit body is a term I employ to mean a body that pre-reflectively
maintains settlement because its perceptual and responsive faculties habitually comply
with the structure of settlement. The settler habit body is constructed at the intersection of
concept, motion, and place because it maintains the abstractness of settlement in the
material world. I see the settler habit body as what Ahmed might refer to as a “sweaty
concept”: a concept that “resists being fully comprehended in the present,” and that
requires description to make tangible its difficultness.22 Sweaty concepts require
describing a situation that is complex or problematic in order to reveal what is conceptual
about “the usual activity of life,” or in the case of settlers, what is pre-reflective.23 Concepts
are at work in what we do; the concept of settlement is at work in what settlers do. To
describe settler bodies is to make visible the patterns of habituation that they use to navigate
their world. The work of decolonizing settler habit bodies is sweaty because it requires the
physical work of turning towards, of feeling the affective weight of resisting or complying
with the normative pressures of settlement and dealing with disorientation.
My focus on the affective dimensions of performing settlement – the feeling that
settler bodies experience when turning away – is mainly inspired by the work of three
scholars who write in the tradition of affect theory. The first is Brian Massumi’s ideas on
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the political ontology of threat, which sees threat as “from the future” and as what brings
ever looming uncertainty. As he describes, “The threat will have been real for all of eternity.
It will have been real because it was felt to be real. Whether the danger was existent or not,
the menace was felt in the form of fear. What is not actually real can be felt into being.
Threat does have an actual mode of existence: fear, as foreshadowing. Threat has an
impending reality in the present. This actual reality is affective.”24 I find in Massumi’s
reading of threat the realness that settlers feel when they are coerced by affective pressures
to maintain settlement.
The second is Lauren Berlant and her thoughts on “cruel optimism,” which she
explains “names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility whose
realization is discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible and
toxic…Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic
object in advance of its loss.”25 In coordination with Massumi’s ideas on threat, I find in
Berlant’s cruel optimism the affective implications of “settler fantasies of entitlement,”
which Eva Mackey defines as a logic that is a “socially embedded, unconscious
expectation[s] of how the world will work.”26 According to Mackey, the fantasy of
settlement requires constant maintenance to make real the unnatural presence of settlers
and thus always carries a threat to certainty. Settlement, as such, is a problematic object to
which settlers remain attached even though it is a toxic fantasy to uphold.
The third theorist who inspired my turn to engage with the affective dimensions of
settlement is Sara Ahmed. Ahmed’s work on “happy objects” positions family as a happy
object that identifies “those who do not reproduce its line as the cause of unhappiness.”27
Following through one’s family lineage in this respect is premised on the promise of
happiness. This speaks to the promise of success that settlers are offered if they continue
along the lines of settlement and the ways they are coerced to maintain the lineage of
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settlement for fear of feeling they are the cause of unhappiness for other settlers. These
three theorists collectively have brought me to consider the affective implications of
turning away and towards the promised happiness of settlement, the threat of uncertainty
regarding settler futurity, and what this means for becoming an interruption that is a
different kind of problem than the settler problem.
My perception of the settler problem, as it was presented to me during the Oka
crisis, was managed relationally to a line of orientation that felt familiar. To unpack this
statement, I look to Sara Ahmed’s books, Queer Orientations and Living a Feminist Life.
In her discussions on “Lines That Direct Us,” she argues that societal norms allow us to
share a direction, a future point in time that we take up to share and connect with others.
Norms dictate our directions by informing our aspirations and future goals. Norms coerce
us to follow certain directions and not others to ensure our happiness and success. Norms
provide a source of stress, a “social pressure to follow a certain course, to live a certain
life, and even to reproduce that life can feel like a physical “press” on the surface of the
body.”28 Norms are therefore directive along a path that is well-trodden, that has been
produced by those who came before us. As Ahmed describes, “The lines that direct us, as
lines of thought as well as lines of motion, are in this way performative: they depend on
the repetition of norms and conventions, of routes and paths taken, but they are also created
as an effect of this repetition.”29 We make that path available to those who come after us
by walking it and keeping it well worn.
At the age of fourteen, nodding and shrugging in repetition was my way of going
along to get along. I was directed by a set of norms that allowed my life to be undisturbed
provided I gave myself over to the momentum and let the stream take me. To be clear,
giving myself over did not simply require my intellectual complicity with the positions of
the developers or the settler state. Giving myself over meant my body had to take up space
in situations moving in one way rather than another. So, I took up space by making myself
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small, nodding and shrugging and generally being amendable to other people’s angry
flailing hands or wise nods of knowing and reassurance.
At the time, my strategy for going along to get along felt harmless because I was
doing nothing that was offensive, or so I thought. I understood my conduct to be a way of
remaining neutral by not interrupting the flow that I understood everyone around me to be
invested in. My comprehension of neutrality emerged in accordance with the liberal
discourses of the time, which touted the stance that everyone was equal. The liberal value
of equality that underpins universal representation in social and political liberal Canada
assumes

“a

nonhierarchically

ordered,

“difference-blind”

form

of

universal

enfranchisement,” which obscures the colonial histories on which the current state of
inequity rests.30 My claim to neutrality was therefore, a denial that I was living as a
beneficiary in the program of settlement. However, claiming neutrality appeared to be a
suitable solution that did not disrupt the current of the stream.
I did not want the bother of hesitation, of asking questions and of being the
problem. The problem, as far as I could perceive, was that Indigenous peoples were
resisting what was inevitable; in which case, the settler problem appeared to me to be the
problem that Indigenous peoples were to settlers. In this definition of the settler problem,
Indigenous peoples become a problem that settlers are tasked with managing into the
current of the stream. This rendition echoes the historical beginnings of colonization in
North America, wherein government programs sought to integrate Indigenous groups into
the format of settlement. As Sarah Carter describes,
The government undertook to protect, care for, and guide the Indians during the
difficult period of transition from “savagery to civilization.” It pursued a deliberate
course of placing Indians upon reserves, developing an interest in labor among
them, and attaching them to agriculture in order to teach them the white man’s
means of support. As well, instruction in agriculture would prepare them for a
“higher civilization” and encourage them “to assume the privileges and
responsibilities of full citizenship.”31
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Incorporating Indigenous bodies into the economic system of settlement was thus a way of
bringing them into the stream of “civilization,” or more pointedly, culturally assimilating
them under the assumption that their cultures were somehow deficient. I was also
inhabiting this stream, and for me, it was not such a terrible place to be. I could not
understand why they should bother being so bothersome as to put their own bodies at risk
because I did not understand how bothered they were. Settlement in Canada appeared
inevitable to me, and so it followed that Indigenous folk should not be so bothered about
it. Or even worse that they should stop interrupting, stop potentially making their situation
worse and just go with it.
The way that I interpreted Indigenous resistance was informed by the norms of
settler society. The stream that was comfortable for me was not comfortable for them, but
norms imply a direction that is shared, and I was certain they shared in the security the
stream provided. The protestors were bothering settlers because they also were bothered
by the settler problem, which appears to them as the problem settlers and their settlement
are to Indigenous peoples. In this definition of the settler problem, Indigenous peoples are
tasked with resisting settlers and their incessant desire to acquire lands at any cost. In her
discussions on the enduring necessity of resistance, Nishnaabeg writer, musician, and
academic Leanne Betasamosake Simpson explains,
They [Simpson’s children] also expect that we will be there [on the land] anyway,
in spite of environmental destruction, despite the violence of surveillance culture,
because they were born into a centuries-old legacy of resistance, persistence, and
profound love that ties our struggle to other Indigenous peoples in the Americas
and throughout the world. It is not happenstance or luck that Indigenous peoples
and our lands still exist after centuries of attack. This is our strategic brilliance. Our
presence is our weapon, and this is visible to me at every protest, every
mobilization, every time a Two Spirit person gifts us with a dance at our powwows,
every time we speak our truths, every time we embody Indigenous life.32
Simpson’s description articulates the ongoing struggle against the imposition of settlement
and how it has become a multigenerational project to defend and protect Indigenous
individuals, cultures, and nations from settlement. The ways that settlement seeks to
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destroy Aboriginal Nations and harm individuals for the sake of lands has always
positioned Indigenous peoples to have to resist.
Bringing Simpson’s insights to my recollection of the Oka crisis speaks to the
insularity of the settler perspective concerning the settler problem. Indigenous resistance
can often appear to settlers as demands for special treatment instead of struggles to be
recognized as sovereign partners. This misrecognition is largely due to Canada’s liberal
multicultural ethos. As Andrew Woolford explains, “The essentialized identity of the First
Nation ‘other,’…presents itself to the liberal mindset of the ordinary citizen as a
relationship of special treatment whereby one group, based upon their ethnic identity,
receives privileges that contradict excepted discourses of equal rights and
responsibilities.”33 The discourses of equality and inclusion that substantiate
multiculturalism are not inclusive of the complex histories of land relations and treaties.
Just as this exclusion of historical lineage allows the settler to claim neutrality, it also
constructs a perception of Indigenous resistance as unsubstantiated and their demands as
unreasonable.
Further to this, implying there has been a clean break between historical colonialism
and present – more equal – circumstances obscures the fact that colonialism continues to
subject settlers’ sovereign partners. The rhetoric of reconciliation, as it is positioned
alongside national discourses of multiculturalism, apology, and liberal ideals is bound up
with presenting this clean break, with purpose. In his discussion concerning the settler
states’ focus on reconciliation, David Garneau has stated,
Re-conciliation refers to the repair of a previously existing harmonious
relationship. This word choice imposes the fiction that equanimity is the status quo
between Aboriginal people and Canada. Initial conciliation was tragically disrupted
and will be painfully restored through the current process. In this context, the
imaginary the word describes is limited to post-contact narratives. This
construction anaesthetizes knowledge of the existence of pre-contact Aboriginal
sovereignty. It narrates halcyon moments of co-operation before things went wrong
as the seamless source of harmonious origin. And it sees the residential school era,
for example, as an unfortunate deviation rather than just one aspect of the perpetual
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colonial struggle to contain and control Aboriginal people, territories, and
resources.34
Programs of reconciliation, as Garneau describes them, are useful for state apologies that
focus on residential schools as the source of Indigenous oppression, as a way to avoid
presenting settlement as a systemic arrangement. This, in turn, obscures the many
components that comprise settlement and that continue to operate today – such as policing
and surveilling, the state’s neglect in upholding their responsibilities for proper funding to
First Nations schooling and healthcare, and most notably, illegal acquisition of lands.35
In her book My Conversations with Canadians, Sto:lo poet and author Lee Maracle
recalls being asked what reconciliation means to her, directly after giving a talk on Missing
and Murdered Indigenous Women. Her initial thoughts were to wonder if the man
understood what reconciliation meant. As Maracle recalls,
I could not believe he jumped to this conclusion without considering the killing was
not over. Did he think we were friends before those men killed us? Did he think we
liked them before they killed us? Did he think I was their friend when they killed
those other women? “Well stop killing us would be a good place to begin,” I
answered. The audience laughed. “Then maybe stop plundering our resources, stop
robbing us of our children, end colonial domination – return our lands, and then we
can talk about being friends. I can’t believe we are having this conversation after
you listened to my presentation about the murder of Indigenous women and
children. It is embarrassing – not for me, but for you.”36
In addition to laying bare the fallacy of reconciliation, Maracle’s response illuminates the
ways that settler perception misunderstands the lived realities of Indigenous peoples. More
pointedly, Indigenous experiences of settlement that subjugate them often appear to settlers
as unrelated to current systemic colonialism because, under the ethos of equality that sees
colonial violence as a thing of the past, it is expected that everyone has equal opportunity
to succeed. From this perspective, the imposition of violence and neglect that settlement
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inflicts upon Indigenous peoples appears to be their own moral failings.37 Views that
position Indigenous peoples as the settler problem are therefore blind to the systemic and
ongoing character of settlement hidden behind national and social discourses that convey
settler occupation as unrelated to Indigenous oppression and therefore, unproblematic.
The common variable between the two definitions of the settler problem is
settlement, or more specifically, settlers. Settlement is a structure that is bolstered by a set
of norms, and it requires bodies to bring these norms into the material world. At the same
time, settlement at present is an existing material structure that bodies move around in as
they live settlement. It is a path that is perceivable to them because it is available; it is welltrodden. Settlers become invested in the success of settlement because it is tied to their
individual successes concerning their way of life. Taking up space as settlers along lines
of orientation means traversing with others along the well-worn path. The work of
traversing happens through various bodily actions such as placing one foot in front of the
other to walk the path or by behaving in ways that are cooperative towards the collective
exercise of traversing. The repetitiveness of traversing, of staying in line amongst others
who stay in line, shapes bodies into bodies that are comfortable being in line. In this way,
norms become bodily habits, “ways of acting and being in relation to others that have
become second nature over time.”38
I did not randomly invent the motions of nodding and shrugging; I learned this
strategy from others who also felt they did not want to bother and by doing these actions
in repetition I learned to habitually not bother. For settlers to dig a little deeper and ask
questions is an interruption, it is to stop in a stream that is directing crowds of people and
make themselves the source of “congestion.”39 The density of the crowd then feels hostile,
less supportive than when you work with them along your mutual trajectory. But in being
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the source of annoyance, in being an interruption, “you would then experience that flow as
a tangible thing: what stops you from stopping; what slows you down.”40 If we do not
pause, we remain unaware of what is coercing our movements. Stops come in the form of
questions such as: why would the Kanien’kehaka people put their lives at risk if they have
no claim to land? Why is everyone upset that I am asking them to explain this? Why do I
care that they will be upset?
To articulate these questions and their answers in language is to name a problem,
which makes it exist outside of ourselves.41 To be clear, this is not an articulation of
settlement that names Indigenous peoples as the settler problem; it is an articulation that
would describe the feelings settlers feel when they are being coerced into becoming a
problem. The purpose of articulations is not necessarily to find an intellectual answer to
the problem; it is to place words to feelings and perceptions and describe in order to make
tangible what keeps us from stopping.
Thinking through lines of orientation is not only useful for understanding flow and
interruption, but also the ways that one can cause a redirection. Going along to get along
is what Ahmed might refer to as a turning away. To turn away is a learned behavior that is
taught to us at a young age. To turn away from people who are homeless, for example, is
“to screen out not only their suffering but their very existence. They are not anything to do
with you.”42 Learning to turn away structures how we understand suffering, “whose
suffering should affect us, or how we should be affected by those sufferings.”43 It also
creates a distinction between who matters and who does not, who is a friend and who is a
stranger.
I perceived my strategy of nods and shrugs to be harmless because I felt I was doing
nothing that was offensive. But to be clear, I was doing nothing offensive to the other
settlers in my stream. My perception of what was offensive and what was not, complied
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with the norms of my settler world. When I turned away from the task of grappling with
and responding to Indigenous resistance, I was indeed being offensive by moving about as
if their suffering did not matter. But if turning away is learned, then it is possible to learn
to turn towards.44 If settlers refuse to turn away and instead turn towards what is difficult,
new paths are created for those who come after us.
Turning towards what is difficult so often appears to settlers as turning towards the
problem that is Indigenous peoples because this is how they interpret the settler problem.
Displacing the source of the problem onto their sovereign partners is how the narratives
that support settlement stay intact. Programs of reconciliation and state apologies
contribute to protecting these narratives by avoiding the dialogical process that is required
to work with their partners. This is likely because Indigenous perspectives have the
potential to undermine and re-arrange the settlement narratives. As Maracle describes,
“Canada views itself as the nicest colonizer in the world. It does not ask the colonized if
they agree with this, Canadians just keep repeating it to each other like bobbleheads that
can’t stop bobbling. It doesn’t occur to them that this statement requires our agreement to
be true.”45 Decolonization requires the work of listening and responding to settlement’s
sovereign partners, of performing mindful and respectful coordination towards land
relations. The paternalistic stance of the settler state that does not enact nor facilitate
ongoing coordination creates the conditions in which settlers can retell the narratives of
settlement as if they do not require validation from others.
These stories and idealizations of the past and the present are not necessarily true
but claim themselves to be by the settler who speaks and lives them as if settlement is a
natural or justified occurrence. This is what Andrea Smith has referred to as “the logics of
settler colonialism,” which Mark Rifkin defines as the “social, ideological, and institutional
processes through which the authority of the settler state…is enacted.”46 The right to
settlement operates as a socially embedded logic, and as such, it requires the constant

Ahmed, Living, 32. See Ahmed’s discussion on turning towards, in which she looks to Audrey Lorde to understand
how we can bear witness to our becoming by using words to describe what we have learned perceptually as children.
45 Maracle, 133.
46 Smith “White Supremacy,”; Rifkin, “States of Feeling.” 343.
44

19

performance of making colonial narratives real. Settlers take up these narratives as habitual
norms while they traverse their lines of orientation. The ways that they interpret and attend
to the settler problem is therefore habitually bound up in their body’s perceptual and motor
faculties.
Maintaining settlement for settlers is a move to uphold power and privilege.
However, it is also a sensing project for settlers, which means that the project of
decolonization must consider the affect of turning away to apprehend how settler bodies
can bring themselves to turn towards. By emphasizing the role of feeling in this project, I
am not suggesting that decolonization is possible if settlers were to feel differently. As
Ahmed has described, histories of oppression come with good intentions and bad feelings;
“they seem to bind together in a certain way, as if to say: by feeling bad I mean well.”47
These expressions of guilt and apology may be authentically felt, but they do little to
change inequitable land relations.48 The same is true about feelings of good intention,
which excuse the privileged body that shrugs and nods because they do not intend to be
offensive. The stream of colonization is always already in motion and it gathers its
momentum and ability to direct with the weight and thickness of the bodies that traverse
its lines; settlers do not need to intend the reproduction of settlement, they merely need to
go with the flow.
It is also not sufficient for individuals to think decolonization by being selfreflexive. Self-reflexivity is a step but in itself cannot undermine the collective production
of privilege and is not a substitution for action. As Andrea Smith argues, “the undoing of
privilege occurs not by individuals confessing their privileges or trying to think themselves
into a new subject position, but through the creation of collective structures that dismantle
the systems that enable these privileges.”49 Smith’s ideas on what dismantling means are
akin to Judy Vaughn’s stance, “You don’t think your way into a different way of acting;
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you act your way into a different way of thinking.”50 Settlement happens through actions
taken by settler bodies, actions that are passive to the stream and simultaneously active in
the stream. Decolonization will require settler bodies to take up the task with their bodies,
with their actions in the material world. Turning towards is therefore not just a feeling, nor
is it a thought, it is a physical movement to turn one’s body in the stream and forge a new
path for others to follow. This thesis seeks to understand the affect involved in turning
away and turning towards to discern how settlers can find resiliency when they feel
uncertain so they can commit and follow through on the performances that are required to
decolonize.
To carry out the work of decolonization or teaching settlers how to be better is not
something that Indigenous peoples should be tasked with. Settlers need to pick up their
responsibility to treaty and regardfully coordinate with their sovereign partners. In order to
establish these kinds of relationships, settlers will need to re-learn how to listen and respond
to Indigenous presence and authority in respectful ways. This is to say that decisions
regarding land relations – land use and the environmental implications of industry, taking
portions of land away from reserves to give to industry, relocating Indigenous groups to
land that is less-desirable, or impeding the growth of Indigenous-owned lands – need to be
conducted in ways that are more equitably advantageous to settlement’s sovereign
partners.51 However, as I have attempted to describe, the habitual perceptions and
responses of settlers are informed by the norms of their settlement stream and they present
obstacles for settlers’ understandings of how to be decolonizing in the world. This thesis
takes up this problem by interrogating what I call the settler habit body, which is a body
that pre-reflectively maintains settlement. But before I can thoroughly define this concept,
it is necessary to turn towards a description of settlement in Canada and unpack the
structure that settler bodies are bound up with.
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Describing Settlement
Settlement in Canada is defined by a specific colonial model that requires the
dispossession of Indigenous peoples from lands. Unlike other models of colonialism where
imperial presence retreats back to their colonial metropoles, colonialism in countries such
as Canada, the U.S., Australia and New Zealand are characterized by permanent settlement.
These settlers take up residence with the intention of replacing Indigenous societies and
maintain their own nation with administrative and legal bodies to sustain their dominion.52

Prior to the inception of the Canadian state, the British Crown signed treaty
agreements with Aboriginal nations to initiate positive economic and military relations.
Since 1975, Canada has signed 25 modern treaties in addition to the 70 historical treaties
carried over from the British Crown. These modern treaties, also known as comprehensive
land claim agreements, are necessary to define lands where treaties were never signed.
European rights to Canadian lands were born from treaties, which means that early
generations of settlers who gained access to lands and resources through treaties became

beneficiaries because Aboriginal nations shared with them.53 The historical foundations of
European rights to lands are based upon shared responsibilities and rights to lands for both
parties.54

While these treaties between settlers and Indigenous peoples were signed and
agreed upon, they have never been upheld to the standard of benefitting both parties. This
is partly because the Crown and Aboriginal peoples do not define treaty the same way. As
Mackey has discussed,

For many Indigenous peoples, treaty was and is a sacred covenant made between
sovereign nations in which they agree to ongoing relationships of respect,
friendship, and peace, and thus recognition of the ongoing sovereignty and rights
of Aboriginal nations…[However], Canada and many Canadians “regard treaties
as an extinguishment of [Aboriginal] rights, and acceptance of the supremacy of
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the crown, and a generous gift of land to the Indians so they might have land of
their own.”55
Although Indigenous nations may regard treaty as the maintenance of relations that are
equally sovereign, treaty for settlers and their state is understood to be a project of land
acquisition and sole dominion. Treaty in the national settler imaginary has come to be
synonymous with “Treaty Indians,”56 an association that delinks the settler nation from its
responsibility to respectful partnership and represents Indigenous peoples as dependents
upon the state’s benevolent governance. This illusion suppresses the role of treaty in the
founding and legitimization of the state through which settlers are beneficiaries.57 The way
that the settler imaginary interprets treaty is not a naïve nor an impartial phenomenon that
reflects a simple misunderstanding between the two parties; it is a functioning component
of colonialism that is required to support the state’s legal dominance over the sovereignties
of Aboriginal nations.

Recognition of Indigenous sovereignties, rights to land, and status rights have been

perpetually under threat. The government has and continues to negotiate land claims
reflecting the grievances of unfulfilled treaty promises to land and the loss of reserve land
or band funds that were unlawfully taken. What is problematic about this process is the
way that the legal system understands – or shows little regard for – the sovereignty of
Aboriginal nations. Canadian law assumes its own legitimacy over Aboriginal Nations
because the Canadian constitution is interpreted to mean that while Aboriginal peoples
have an inherent right to self-governance, it has to be reconciled with Crown sovereignty.58
“Reconcile” as it is used here, does not mean a meeting half-way for both parties, but

instead suggests that “the legal sovereignty of the state always supersedes Aboriginal
rights.”59 The underlying ideological assumption and legal attitude on which English
colonialism in Canada rests is that their authority is always un-problematic and in being
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so, it can claim centrality.60 The treaty agreements are therefore delegitimized by Canadian
law, which does little to defend or respect their sovereign partners.

Settler appropriation of land was not carried out solely by legal frameworks that
sought to destabilize Indigenous treaty rights and eliminate status. To legitimize ongoing
land appropriation, the destruction of Indigenous cultures was deemed necessary and the
ability to do so required instilling in settlers “a sense of superiority and entitlement to
legally define Indigenous cultures as inferior.”61 The legal system worked in conjunction
with other national policies implemented to destroy Aboriginal cultures. These policies
increased between the resource extraction of the late 1700s when Indigenous peoples were
advantageous for the state’s resource economy and as military allies, and European
settlement of the early 1800s when European settlers became concerned with acquiring
land for agriculture and settlement.62 The interconnected efforts of cultural genocide and
land appropriation worked “as a means to open space for the nation with the intent of
containing and assimilating Aboriginal peoples.”63

While political apologies in Canada have been given for programs of cultural
genocide, it is widely discussed that land appropriation is not given mention as its
inseparable correlate. As James Daschuk has argued, “Any serious consideration of
Indigenous land tenure in western Canada must consider mortality from epidemic disease
as a central determinant in the occupational history of the region.”64 Apologizing for
cultural assimilation strategies, such as the “sixties scoop” and residential schools, thus
becomes “a synecdoche for colonialism,”65 behind which the counterpart of land theft

remains suppressed. As Jennifer Henderson has made clear, making apology of this type
the most visible of Indigenous moves towards rightful reparations is advantageous for
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settlement because “from the point of view of the state – ﬁnancial reparations for residential
schooling can be individualized and contained in a way that land claims cannot.”66 Building
upon Henderson’s insights, Mackey suggests that the residential schools as synecdoche
approach “transforms the broader material colonial processes into something containable
and…“apologizable,” precisely through vacating the pivotal role that land appropriation
played in colonial processes.”67 De-associating residential schools from settlers’
illegitimate land appropriation obscures the fact that land theft and cultural genocide have
always worked together to realize and maintain the contemporary nation-state.

In 1991, the federal government formed the Royal Commission of Aboriginal
Peoples (RCAP) to help address the obstacles plaguing the relationship between Aboriginal
peoples (Inuit, Métis, and First Nations), the Canadian government, and Canadian society.
This initiative was brought about in response to the 1990 “Oka crisis” in Quebec, when a
land dispute between Kanien’kehaka people (the “Mohawk”) and the settler town of Oka,
violently erupted.68 After years of examining the issues that confront Aboriginal peoples
within the evolution of settler-Indigenous relations, the RCAP published its final report in
1996. The report states that as a result of treaties, “Canadians have, over time, inherited the
wealth generated by Aboriginal lands and resources...Thus...Canadians...can equally be
considered participants in the treaty process ... as the contemporary beneficiaries of the
treaties.”69 The RCAP’s stance is that we are all treaty peoples – inclusive of the state and
Canadians – and as such, “the terms of the treaties define the rights and responsibilities of
both parties.”70 It is, therefore, the responsibility of settlers to maintain proper treaty
relations, yet the incentive to do so is at odds with the national culture, which understands
treaty to be a gift from the state to Aboriginal nations.
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To summarize, settlement in Canada is a permanent colonial settlement founded on
treaty agreements. These treaties initiated sovereign partnerships between the historic
Crown of Canada and Aboriginal nations, and have been carried over into the
contemporary state and joined by modern treaties. Recent evaluations by the RCAP on the
evolution of Indigenous-settler relations has shown that treaty relations have not been
responsibly upheld, which is why settler Canadians are the contemporary beneficiaries.
These inequitable results have emerged by way of national policies that sought to influence
national settler culture and instill in settlers a sense of superiority. As discussed, Canadian
law assumes its legitimacy over Indigenous peoples, making it appear as if Aboriginal
nations require the jurisdiction of Crown sovereignty. To garner this legal dominance, the
state needed to define Indigenous peoples as inferior in the settler imaginary because it has
no legal grounds for its dominion. National policies of cultural genocide and assimilation
were thus instated to destabilize Aboriginal nations for the purposes of delegitimizing
Indigenous sovereignties. Formal apologies made by the government forefront cultural
assimilation programs as a synecdoche for colonialism, which obscures the core reason
these programs were instituted: to legitimize land appropriation.

Describing Settlerness
The national settler culture in Canada is shaped by the state’s colonizing program.
While the RCAP urges settlers to actively take up the task of decolonizing relations, the
incentive to perform responsible treaty relations is at odds with how the settler understands
their role in Canadian society. The colonial legacy reflects an understanding of settlement
as sole dominion and not partnerships, as illustrated by the discrepancy in treaty definitions
between the state and Aboriginal nations and enforced by Canadian law. Based upon what
has been presented to settlers through the national narratives, they understand themselves
to be the rightful owners of their property with no expectation that they should consider
nor respect the treaties that bind them in partnership to Aboriginal peoples. As I have
discussed, this is partly because the settler imaginary sees Indigenous peoples in ways that
redefine and thus reallocate the settler problem away from themselves. This, in turn,
relieves the settler of immediate responsibility to upholding proper treaty relations because
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it places the blame on historical events and peoples or on the perceived moral inferiority
of their sovereign partners.

While the hegemonic structure in Canada seeks to accommodate pluralism, the laws
and regulating systems ascribe to a liberal white framework for understanding the
boundaries of freedom and nation-building.71 Settlers who are normative within this
hegemonic structure are defined by their whiteness, British heritage and being a descendant
of multigenerational settlement that formed the contemporary state of Canada.72 While
newer Canadian immigrants may not fit this normative profile, they are absorbed into the
structure of the settler nation through ideologies such as multiculturalism in Canada.73
While there are many forms of multiculturalism, Canada’s brand, in particular, is one if
liberal culturalism, which “value[s] the sanctity of individual autonomy” under one nation
and claims itself to be a model for equality.74 Each individual who lives this autonomy is
responsible for their own successes and failures because liberal frameworks deny the
presence of systemic prejudice and oppression. This absorbs new Canadians into the labor

force under the ideological presupposition that their hard work will determine their success
within the structure of settlement. This is how settlers become involved in the Canadian
economy, which is built from and continues to rely on land.

Settler bodies can be intersectionally marked, or they may carry a normative profile,
and they may also take up a variety of economic and socioeconomic positionalities. What
differentiates settlers from Indigenous peoples in settler society is that they do not have
treaty rights and therefore are not a threat to the state’s sole dominion. This means that the

types of systemic oppression that settlers experience have different historical bases,
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trajectories, and affiliated narratives to substantiate unjust treatment than those inflicted
upon Indigenous peoples. While the government seeks to manage marked settler bodies, it
does so with the incentive of growing the labor force by collecting and integrating bodies
into the economy. In contrast, Indigenous bodies are designated for destruction because the
state has always sought to suppress their right to sovereign partnership. All settlers –
normative or not – are beneficiaries of inequitable treaty relations either because they are
descendants of early settlers or they become bound up in Canada’s social practices and
economy. In any case, colonialism works through the everyday performances of settler
bodies, which carry forward the colonial legacy. Settlers are therefore privileged in
Canadian society because their bodies and lives are valuable for enabling settlement.

Chapter Summaries
In chapter one of this thesis, I discuss the concept of the habit body to provide
pertinent theoretical grounding for situating the settler habit body in subsequent chapters.
The overall aim of this thesis is to re-present settler colonialism as an embodied habitual
practice that is malleable to change. However, any discussions concerning change must
begin with articulating the frame of habit construction within the body, more generally. I
begin with a close reading of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and proceed
further using critical phenomenology theorists for a more nuanced placement of bodily
habits in societal context. My argument in chapter one maintains that viewing privileged
bodies as habitually maintaining the status quo by actively holding habits brings to them
the responsibility of examining their perceptual frameworks.

In chapter two, I utilize the lens of the habit body to contemplate the efficacy of
settler bodies for performing decolonization. Working closely with Eva Mackey’s
ethnographic research on settler-Indigenous relations, I forefront the “sweaty” work of
living and confronting settlement, as a settler. Bringing in terms from phenomenology,
metaphysics, and affect theory, I read and interrogate settlerness. I claim that the structure
of settlement is habitual in the settler body and is apparent in the ways they sense the world.
I argue that a practise of resiliency to the affective implications of decolonization is
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necessary. My aim in chapter two is to flesh out the shift from the theoretical work of
habituation with the embodied perspective of settlerness in Canada.
The final chapter of this thesis is concerned with taking up the problematic question
of how settlers can open their habitual faculties to form more equitable land relations.
Looking to critical phenomenologists, I explicate how settler habitual faculties can be
reshaped affectively. I draw from settler-colonial scholars and Indigenous thinkers, leaders
and scholars to discuss the compatibility of Indigenous philosophies of treaty – Guswentha
– with phenomenological approaches – “seeing with.” My discussion in part one of this
chapter picks up and investigates Eva Mackey’s question, “how can we listen to others
when we already know?”75 My discussion in part two aims to take this investigation from
understanding how settlers can do differently into the more concerning question of why
settlers would take up the task of decolonizing work. I conclude by arguing that habits
determine our expectations for the future, and as such, incremental changes in habits bring
different expectations for our futures into view. If settler bodies begin the sweaty work of
decolonization, they become open to new possibilities for understanding themselves in the
world. In which case, how the settler does differently changes why they would want to be
different.
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Chapter One: The Habit Body in the World
Introduction
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s structure of the habit body emerged within his body of
work as a way to understand systems of relations between humans and their world. One of
his most important contributions to the field of phenomenology was description as a formal
methodology for reflecting on embodied human existence. To be able to articulate our prereflective experience is to get close to the “present and living reality” of our perception,
which is useful for studying human relations as well as their relationships to language
culture and society.76 Our bodies are always approaching the world through our habits,
which frame how we perceive the encounter. To describe these encounters is, therefore, to
reveal, as I describe below, what is invisible in the moment of perception. To describe the
burning our squinting eyes feel when it is too bright is to make apparent that there is not
enough shade.
Merleau-Ponty’s return to the primacy of perception brought focus to the perception
of our presence in the world. Given his involvement with political commentary and
analysis, he did not see his theoretical work as disconnected from his political engagement
and in fact believed philosophy needed to become more real-world engaged.77 As Moran
describes, “In political terms, Merleau-Ponty saw his mission as reconciling dialectical
materialism with freedom.”78 I read Merleau-Ponty’s ideas on the habit body to be a
political project of the body, a body that describes its experience of the world against the
universalizing narratives that might tell them otherwise. To describe the sensations of being
a settler in Canada makes the pressures of norms apparent against the promise of happiness
that orients us towards our common goal. To describe the feeling of entitlement is to reveal
the ways that settler consciousness has been shaped by the conditions of settlement. In The
Primacy of Perception, Merleau-Ponty explains,
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By these words, “the primacy of perception”, we mean that the experience of
perception is our presence at the moment when things, truths, values, are constituted
for us; that perception is a nascent logos; that it teaches us, outside all dogmatism,
the true conditions of objectivity itself; that it summons us to the tasks of knowledge
and action. It is not a question of reducing human knowledge to sensation, but of
assisting at the birth of this knowledge, to make it as sensible as the sensible, to
recover the consciousness of rationality. This experience of rationality is lost when
we take it for granted as self-evident, but is, on the contrary, rediscovered when it
is made to appear against the background of non-human nature.79
The true conditions of objectivity as we sense them come to us through our faculties of
habitual perception, which I will explain below as a structured way of seeing the world.
Our perception, before we apply reason or rationalize it is our sense of our conditions.
Perception and reason together constitute our reflexive reasoning and our pre-reflective
habit. How we perceive is thus not impartial to the social and political milieu that we
inhabit. Our pre-reflective experience is where we feel settlement before we can rationalize
it, but we are feeling settlement none the less, and settlement is a political structure.
This chapter deliberates on the habit body to provide pertinent theoretical
grounding for situating the settler habit body in subsequent chapters. The overall aim of
this thesis is to re-present settler colonialism as an embodied habitual practice that is
malleable to change. However, any discussions concerning change must begin with
articulating the frame of habit construction within the body, more generally. To accomplish
this, I build upon a close reading of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work in Phenomenology of
Perception, to discuss the habit body as a correlative structure to the external world. I bring
this lens in particular to settler bodies because it complicates propositions for
decolonization that place importance on the onto-epistemological stance of the settler. Such
approaches suggest that decolonization requires the settler to “think” outside settlement or
be open to intellectualizing their settlement practices differently. But as I will describe in
this chapter, the ways our bodies interact with the world are not separate from what we
think or how we know ourselves. In which case, it is not an efficacious strategy for settlers
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to think their way to becoming decolonizing; they must know themselves as decolonizing
in the world.
Bodies carry pre-reflective knowledge that assists their navigation in the world.
This means that our bodies find their way around the world without explicit instruction
from conscious thought. What we think and how we know the world with our bodies is not
a mind over matter procedure, but a nuanced production that inextricably links our
understanding of ourselves and the world with our body’s exploration of it. With every
movement our bodies make, their intellect, consciousness, and corporeal being are
intertwined and co-constitutive.80 The body is a subject-object because it is a material body
with a consciousness that is conditioned by the world, as it conditions it. This chapter
discusses the integral components of the habit body and its character to provide a basis for
further chapters that problematize the habitual faculties of settlers.
The first section of this chapter unpacks the main terms and operations of the habit
body. Bodily intentionality and consciousness are discussed as faculties emergent from the
body’s interactions with the exterior world. Bodily intentionality is a complex system that
does not merely respond to intellectual instruction but responds to the world using prereflective perceptual engagement. Over time, the body’s perceptual faculties and its
responses to the world become habitual.
The second section of this chapter discusses the role of culturally instituted
practices and how they come to be embedded in the habitual perceptions and bodily
responses of bodies. The perceptive faculties of the body learn from and thus reflect the
hegemonic order of the larger cultural milieu. This teaches our bodies how to see, it overdetermines what we see, and it defines the relationships we form to other figures. These
relations thus reflect the larger hierarchies of the cultural milieu and therefore influence
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how the normative body performs its privilege relationally to marked bodies. Through
repetition, this mode of conduct becomes habitual for privileged bodies.
The final section of this chapter contemplates the distinction between sedimentation
and habit for the purposes of understanding how privileged bodies can take responsibility
for their bodily habits. While sedimentation is the body’s index of acquired skills – how to
lift objects and walk around them – habit is the process that discerns which skills will be
utilized and which will not. To maintain habits that are oppressive is thus not a passive
existence, but an active way of being in the world. To focus on habit and not sedimentation
facilitates an approach to changing habit bodies that perform and thus maintain systems of
oppression.
Overall, my argument maintains that although habits of perception and response
are un-conscious, they become habitual behavior that can be consciously analyzed. To view
privileged bodies as habitually maintaining the status quo by actively holding habits brings
to them the responsibility of examining their perceptual frameworks. As each body is
unique in its relation to the hegemonic order, the task of un-monumentalizing privileged
bodies will be as unique to each body as the intersections of milieu that teach its habitual
perception and response.

The Body in the World
In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty discusses the body as a complex
perceptual system inextricably linked with consciousness and the world. He argues that
“The body is the vehicle of being in the world, and for a living being, having a body means
being united with a definite milieu, merging with certain projects, and being perpetually
engaged therein.”81 The projects that our bodies take up pertain to our consciousness, as
“consciousness itself is a project of the world.”82 When we intend towards objects with our

81
82

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 84.
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, xxxii.

33

desires, we find ourselves in our practical and perceptual involvements with things.83 These
projects are not conducted by the thought of a movement nor the movement itself, nor are
they tandem operations from thought to movement or vice versa; they are movement and
consciousness of movement that give us “moments of a single whole.”84 But our
movements in the world are not just for ourselves, as they are situated in the milieu of our
world and, as such, they are affected by social, cultural, political, and historical forces that
comprise that milieu.
My body stands in the world as an object and simultaneously as a subject. The
relationship between my body as an object and as a subject is not one of complete
differentiation, as “all consciousness is consciousness of something.”85 My consciousness
understands my body as being a physical presence that is part of my external world. How
I know and understand myself is dependent upon how I learn myself in relation to the
objects I encounter outside myself and what they mean to me. This body is at once sensing
and sensible, and it is what Merleau-Ponty refers to as “the phenomenal body.” The
meanings I make when I encounter objects in the world do not ascribe to an explanation of
linear causation, whereby my interactions align with a universal meaning. I make meanings
of my perceptual encounters at the intersections of my bodily intentions and the milieu I
live amongst, and these intersections produce the context that is my own personal
worldview. The perceptual interactions that my body has with objects and other people are
therefore a self-organizing process in which my consciousness is shaped.
Since our conscious understanding is always a perceiving engagement with the
world, our bodies are directed towards objects and people to fulfil our thoughts, beliefs,
and desires. This intentionality is not solely a product that involves intellectual thought as
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a separate function and master over the motility of the body; although it is sometimes the
case that my body will say “don’t forget your keys” and then walk towards the key bowl.
Husserl’s distinction between “act intentionality” and “operative intentionality” is
significant here for understanding the body as having its own system of thought and action
inextricably linked to objective thought and the world.86 Act intentionality is “the
intentionality of our judgements and our voluntary decisions,” which are decided upon in
conscious thought much like the explicit instructions I give myself to procure my keys.87
Operative intentionality is the intentionality that appears in our desires and evaluations that
we must then articulate in language.
Operative intentionality is pre-reflective, meaning it is a bodily intention that
happens before we can consciously reflect on it. It is instances like these where we find
ourselves unable to remember if we accomplished certain tasks, such as grabbing our keys
on the way to work, until we consciously confirm it by finding our keys in our pocket.
These experiences happen at the level of bodily perception and utilize our body’s own
awareness of ourselves in the world. 88 This means I may tell myself not to forget my keys,
but I do not have to tell my body how to grasp the keys and walk to the front door. While
moving about in the world at times might be an intellectual endeavor, it is intricately fused
to a perceptive performance. To understand the external world requires the body “to grasp
the total intention” and not just the properties, narratives, and ideas that can be
intellectualized.89 Objects carry properties that give them a unique manner of existing
because they provide experiential knowledge. In other words, if I consciously remind
myself to intend towards my keys, my body models my grasp to anticipate my hand’s
encounter with their lightness and serrated edges so as not to drop them or cut myself,
without an objective thought to do so. To know my keys is therefore not only to know them
in thought but know them in my hand. Husserl’s operative intentionality is more akin to
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Merleau-Ponty’s conception of bodily intentionality, which does more than serve
intellectual thought.
Bodily intentionality is my body being in the world, responding to tasks with
perceptive engagement. Perceptive encounters are the body’s first encounters in the world,
being that they precede a child’s induction into frames of understanding provided by the
language they acquire to explain their experiences.90 The child’s first world is the sensible
world, in which “he understands well beyond what he knows how to say, responds well
beyond what he could define.”91 Open to the world by way of their senses, the child is
unrestricted by the linearity of language that is insufficient for communicating the multidimensional character of lived experience. The moments we live in the world are moments
in which our histories and our hopes and desires for the future all come to inform our
perception of the present encounter. Language structures how we communicate our
perception of experiences as a relating communal endeavor; therefore, the use of language
translates the dynamic personal experience of the individual into a fixed interpretation for
the purpose of mutual understanding.92 However, language and perception are also not
completely differentiated but are intertwined structures of meaning-making that give us
different ways of grasping our circumstances. Our experience may not be reducible to
language, but language lends itself to our ability to make sense of the world. Our experience
has an original meaning and a related system of intentionality which allows the body to
understand its world outside of linguistic representations or being subordinated to a
“symbolic” or “objectifying” function.93 Bodily intentionality is this primary perceptive
system, or “practical directedness towards the world” through bodily consciousness. It is

90

Merleau-Ponty, Visible/ Invisible, 11.
Merleau-Ponty, Visible/Invisible, 13.
92 Moran, 405. Moran argues that “Merleau-Ponty sees the tendency towards disregarding historicality and temporality
as in part due to the manner in which thought comes to expression in a language. The congealing of temporal thinking
into language and concepts acts to fix meanings, to give the appearance of absoluteness. Furthermore, through language
and signs the constituted human social world is brought about, and constitutes a ‘system.”
93 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 141. “The motor experience of our body is not a particular case of knowledge; rather,
it offers us a manner of reaching the world and the object, a “praktognosia,” that must be recognized as original, and
perhaps as originary. My body has its world, or understands its world without having to go through “representations,” or
without being subordinated to a “symbolic” or “objectifying” function.
91

36

therefore important for understanding the intending body as a more complex system than
merely an expression of intellectual mastery over the body’s motility.94
When my body encounters an object, my perception of it relies upon its spatial
arrangement to other objects. As I locate my keys on the dresser’s surface, I narrow my
view to bring the keys into focus, which sends the other objects around it into the
background. The object of my intention is the keys and the objects surrounding it create
the horizon against which I can focus my intent. To bring my focus to the smaller details
in the keys, to pick them up and turn them around in my hand as I inspect them, requires
that I focus on some of the details while others recede. Through this object-horizon
structure of perceiving, I “suspend the surroundings in order to see the object better, and to
lose in the background what is gained in the figure.”95 My awareness of the dresser is
therefore imperative to my view of the keys because in not being the keys, the dresser
becomes the background against which the keys appear to me.
My perception of objects is learned and indexed over the course of different
experiences with them. My bodily movements that I use to maneuver objects with my
hands is always a perceptual exploration through which I create a bodily and conscious
memory of their many sides, textures, and weights. As Merleau-Ponty describes:
Each moment in time gives itself as a witness to all others. It shows, by taking
place, “how this was bound to happen” and “how it will have ended.” Each present
definitively establishes a point that solicits the recognition of all others. Thus, the
object is seen from all times just as it is seen from all places, and by the same means,
namely, the horizon structure. The present still holds in hand the immediate past,
but without positing it as an object, and since this immediate past likewise retains
the past that immediately preceded it, time gone by is entirely taken up and grasped
in the present.96
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In the present, my memories allow me to understand objects as having different angles
even as my body stands to face or touch only one side of them. Looking down upon the
keys on the dresser, I am aware that what I see of them in that moment is not the only
perception of the keys that can be had. Although I may look at the keys, my view of them
overlaps with my other sense memories to know the keys as carrying potential; I know
these keys to be an extension of my body and not a one-dimensional picture.
Being that my perception is an accumulation of learned experiences, my bodily
intentions have both a spatial and temporal horizon. Although object encounters happen in
a distinct moment in time, those moments draw upon my past perceptual experiences. The
moment that I encounter the object, it is “seen from all times just as it is seen from all
places, and by the same means, namely, the horizon structure.”97 Just as the spatial horizon
facilitates my perception of an object through relief, the temporal horizon structure is
necessary for me to have a present that is immanent to yet differentiated from moments in
history and the flow of duration into the future.98 This distinct moment in time is where
my body gains consciousness. Merleau-Ponty argues that “the present (taken broadly, with
its originary horizons of past and future) has, nevertheless, a privileged status because it is
the zone in which being and consciousness coincide.”99 The present is where “ultimate
consciousness” can be found because it is where “my being and consciousness are one.” It
is also where “We indubitably communicate with ourselves by communicating with the
world. We hold time in its entirety and we are present to ourselves because we are present
in and towards the world.”100 The horizons that surround us help us establish our immediate
“field of presence”: a situation or a point in time that references other points in time and
that will become a point of reference for future points in time. To be conscious, then is to
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be perceptually experiencing in a moment. In which case, we are always intending towards
the world to know ourselves.
In addition to helping us establish our presence, our horizons determine the quality
of that presence and ultimately our consciousness. According to Merleau-Ponty, our
intending bodies perceive the world in accordance with a multitude of horizons that
comprise the particulars of our individual situation:
The life of consciousness – epistemic life, the life of desire, or perceptual life – is
underpinned by an “intentional arc” that projects around us our past, our future, our
human milieu, our physical situation, our ideological situation, and our moral
situation, or rather, that ensures that we are situated within all of these relationships.
The intentional arc creates the unity of the senses, the unity of the senses with
intelligence, and the unity of sensitivity and motricity.101
The intentional arc draws together the intertwined aspects of our existence, making them
inseparable components that influence our lives. How our bodies perceive the world and
respond to it is informed and conditioned by the material and immaterial relationships,
influences, and obstacles that make up the milieu of our world and are part of this
intentional arc. My field of presence when I grasp my keys does not exist in a vacuum
because the meaning that is made in that moment tethers together my consciousness, my
external horizons, and my perceiving body. The multitude of horizons under which I
perceive my tardiness informs my body’s pre-reflective performance to swiftly grasp the
keys, find the door, and start my car.

The Habit Body
As my body flows through moments, it’s motions pre-reflectively draw upon a
system of equivalent positions that it has learned in previous spaces and times. This is the
makeup of my body schema, which Merleau-Ponty describes as an understanding of one’s
body as possessing a variety of motor tasks that are instantly transposable.102 The
transposibility of movements is not as simple as applying an individual movement to
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individual stimuli because the activities and conditions with which my body performs are
never identical. Grasping my keys might resemble my motions to reach and grasp for the
salt on the table, but how my body carries out these tasks requires different amalgamations
of perception and engagement. The objects that I handle solicit my touch differently by
way of their material make-up.
The reach and grasp I use to procure my keys are not simply predicated on a
cognitive evaluation of comparative length, whereby I consciously recognize the reach is
two feet. Places in space are not objective positions in relation to the position of our bodies
but are points that solicit and capture our intentions, and through this performance I learn
the space by bestowing intention and meaning onto an object. Objects also become
extensions of our bodies, whereby we understand space through them. When I pass the
saltshaker to my friend, I know that the shaker adds inches to my reach, and I find my
friend’s grasp at the other end of it and not at my fingertips. Passing the salt is a different
spatial estimation than inserting my keys into my car door yet, in both cases my body’s
motor functions employ the actions of reach, grasp, and maneuvering an object as an
extension of the body.
The system of equivalences our bodies acquire that inform the process of
transposibility become habitual for our bodies. For our bodies to be habitual means that
they understand the world in a way that is pre-reflective because they have sedimented
experiences of those actions in the body. This is what Merleau-Ponty asserts is the body’s
way of “gearing into” the world, which he means as the body’s grasp that attunes it to the
world, or the way in which the body takes hold of and adapts to the world around it.103 The
body’s ability to gear in helps it incorporate new understandings that then become
sedimented once the body can carry out the task appropriately. The body’s ability to
transpose these sedimentations means it carries not only “a system of current positions, but
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also, and consequently, as an open system of an infinity of equivalent positions in different
orientations.”104 This is more precisely what Merleau-Ponty terms “the body schema,”
which he describes as “not merely an experience of my body, but rather an experience of
my body in the world.”105 Although these movements take place below the level of
conscious activity, bodily habits cannot be reduced to reflex because each circumstance
requires that the body become accustomed to something new. In which case, we can say
that habit occupies the overlapping space of conscious and non-conscious being, a space
in which our body conjures the accord between “what we aim at and what is given, between
the intention and the realization.”106
Distinguishing between the habitual body and the actual body, Merleau-Ponty
argues that the two bodies consistently co-penetrate each other.107 The actual body is the
body of reflexive existence, meaning it allows me to understand the physiological
processes of how to reach and grasp. The habitual body is the pre-reflexive body that knows
how to reach, grasp and handle the saltshaker or the keys as part of its own being. These
two bodies co-penetrate each other as we switch between movements and adjust to the task
required. This is how we stitch together our body’s intentions with objects to realize our
consciousness.
To summarize, this section has discussed the basic characteristics that comprise the
habit body. Our bodies in the world allow us to perceive and are therefore essential to
attaining consciousness. How we know ourselves is dependent on how we know ourselves
in relation to the temporal and spatial perceptual encounters we have with the external
world. We extend our bodies towards objects we interact with to fulfil our intentions and
desires, which are imminently connected to our past experiences and future aspirations.

104

Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 142.
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 142.
106 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 146.
107 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, 84. Merleau-Ponty discusses the habit body and the actual body in regards to patients
who have lost a limb: “In the case we are considering, the ambiguity of knowledge amounts to this: it is as though our
body comprises two distinct layers, that of the habitual body and that of the actual body. Gestures of manipulation that
appear in the first have disappeared in the second, and the problem of how I can feel endowed with a limb that I no longer
have in fact comes down to knowing how the habitual body can act as a guarantee for the actual body.”
105

41

Our body’s pre-reflective knowledge of the world is what makes it possible for us to move
about without intellectual instruction, and it is built upon the body’s accumulation of
experiences in which it employs transposable motor tasks. Our body schema is where each
new exploration that requires transposable action becomes indexed or sedimented. The
process of transposibility becomes habitual for our bodies, which means that our bodies
can perform tasks as pre-reflective habits. This is how my body knows to handle my keys
and the saltshaker appropriately without explicit instructions, and how it settles into the
new shape.
Our pre-reflective ways of being in the world are premised on two distinct yet
interrelated habits of the body: habitual perception and habitual bodily response. These two
functions do not necessarily correlate in any causal way but nourish each other to create
bodies that habitually carry forward social and political structures in the world. Although
our movements are pre-reflective, they are not inherently static. But before the discussion
of changeable bodies can be had, it is necessary to understand how bodies bring culturally
instituted worldviews into existence. What is at stake when bodies become correlates of
these structures is the quality of consciousness that is produced. In the next section, I focus
specifically on privileged bodies who tend to take up their positionalities in the world at
the expense of their others.

Habitual Perception and Bodily Response
Perceptual habits formed in the individual are also cultivated in relation to the
cultural level. Cultural habits of perception are ways of perceiving that have been instituted,
whereby they produce influential new ways of understanding people, things, and relations
between them.108 Habits that are shared culturally often reflect a sense for what is
normative. Normative qualities are determined by hegemonic ideals, against which
perceived bodies are judged. This implement of measure is not established in relation to
true innateness of any particular body or bodies, but functions as fantasy or “an ontological
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principal in the sense of a ground and an origin.”109 In Broken Hegemonies, Reiner
Schürmann refers to this presence as “hegemonic phantasm”:
In order to constitute the phenomenality of phenomena, in order to universalize
them, a representational order must organize itself around a principle, a phantasmic
referent measuring all representations. A hegemonic phantasm so conceived not
only directs us to refer everything to it, but has, furthermore, an endless supply of
significations, that is to say, normative measures. It is the position [posé] to which
all practical and cognitive laws relate, in the final instance, all acts and all
phenomena.110
The hegemonic phantasm is hegemonic in its being a horizon against which the figure is
perceived relationally. It is phantasmic because it disappears in the moment that we
encounter the figure, making the illusion appear real and absolute instead of a way our
perception is learned and structured.
Linda Alcoff’s work in Visible Identities speaks to the point that culturally
instituted ways of perceiving act through the object-horizon to sediment perceptual habits.
She argues that race is a structure of contemporary perception that constitutes the horizon
rather than the figure that stands out. Racialization is a learned perceptual habit and it
presents to us the figure and defines racialized people just as it becomes “tacit, almost
hidden from view, and thus almost immune from critical reflection.”111 This horizon,
against which all acts that I perceive stand out, is what I understand to be the natural setting
of my thoughts. The learned-ness of my perception is difficult to locate and interrogate
because my perception is a pre-reflective understanding of the world that precedes
conscious evaluation. This does not mean that these habits of perception cannot change,
but to change them requires making the faculties of perceiving visible.
While Alcoff and Schürmann bring attention to how race works from the ground of
the object-horizon structure, Alia Al-Saji’s work on The Racialization of Muslim Veils
brings attention to what this means for revealing the figure. Al-Saji argues that each time
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a Muslim woman is perceived against western representations of Muslim women, she is
marked or pre-determined as oppressed. The woman is not simply seen as veiled, nor is
she seen as she appears to herself or even as she might describe herself and her individual
circumstances as not oppressive. She is seen as a pre-determined discursive representation
who “cannot be seen as otherwise,” and who “ cannot be seen as a subject who takes up
and constitutes itself through that oppression.”112 The Muslim woman becomes visible as
a figure whose victimhood and voiceless-ness is overdetermined. Simultaneously, the
woman becomes invisible in that her perceived lack of subjectivity means she needs to be
spoken for in political life, divesting her of a self-originating voice.113 The object-horizon
structure then does not simply operate to reveal the figure or object in itself. Instead, it
reveals and conceals particular traits of the figure whereby it appears already loaded with
meaning.
In The Habits of Racism, Helen Ngo discusses the habitual reactions that emerge
from white women’s interactions with racialized others. Movements such as tensing,
flinching, and moving away, are all examples of unthinking racist bodily habits that she
carries in her bodily repertoire and that are “available to her upon the unanticipated
interaction with a Black man.”114 These reactions cannot necessarily be explained by
bodily reflex or unconscious bias because reactions vary dependent upon the stereotypes
perceived. This is to say that the woman’s reaction to two differently racialized men would
not be identical. The habitual reaction correlates with the stereotype, just as Merleau-Ponty
describes habit as “the power of responding with a certain type of solution to a certain form
of situation.115 The horizon and its ability to comport itself as a hegemonic phantasm is
thus an integral component for habituating racializing perception and response.
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While these habits are perceptual toward the figure-horizon arrangement, they are
also premised on the perception of one’s own body as situated within the event. The
unanticipated encounter between the white woman and the racialized man in Ngo’s
description of racist bodily habits is again useful for grounding this claim. A white woman
who fears the stereotype of the Black man will react differently than the racialized man she
encounters during the unexpected meeting. This is because the body of the perceiver is “the
always unimplied third term of the figure-background structure, and each figure appears
perspectivally against the double horizon of external space and bodily space.” 116 The white
woman’s awareness of her body as having an intersection of certain qualities – whiteness,
petite stature, femininity –informs her perception of the figure she perceives, under the
hegemonic horizon. Not only does her body understand him to be representative of
violence, but her body also understands itself as being a likely victim to that violence. Her
reaction is therefore not just to a stereotype she understands cognitively nor one that is
implied by the object-horizon structure. The interaction she has engages her entire body in
the meaning-making system underpinned by the hegemonic order.
For the racialized man in the encounter, the woman may pose an immediate
physical threat should she panic and call out for help although, additionally he feels her to
be a psychic threat. Aware of his own perceptible bodily qualities and what they mean
within the hegemonic horizon, he perceives her gaze as overdetermining him from the
outside by correlating his body with violent perpetrators.117 The habitual perception and
bodily reactions that emerge from both people are therefore in accord with the figure they
encounter, as it is imbued with particular attributes by the phantasmic horizon. But their
reactions also reflect what the hegemonic order determines they will be to each other –
perpetrator and victim – as bodies that make meaning of that order through lived
experience.
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The Performance of Privilege
Bodily racism is one example of many sedimented biases that reflect the hegemonic
horizon. These implements of measure condition our bodily extensions into the world,
thereby shaping our consciousness. The performance of privilege exemplifies a style of
bodily comportment that is acquired from receiving anticipated responses from the
world.118 For Merleau-Ponty, the flow between action and response is how the body
understands itself as geared into the world, a world that it successfully knows or is trying
to correct itself to know with every move it makes. Privileged bodies will, therefore,
understand how to extend themselves differently than bodies that do not fit the desired or
normative form.
The sense of entitlement and bodily confidence will vary between individuals in
particular circumstances. Performances in spaces like predominantly white male corporate
settings in North America might elicit unexpected or variant responses from bodies who
feel themselves to be a source of unease for those around them – such as nervousness, a
wavering voice, or an overly stern demeanor. These bodies become conscious of
themselves by extending into spaces where they encounter significantly more obstacles
than their normative colleagues. The hostility of these environments creates for them an
uneasy passage through space, demonstrating that bodily relations to space are not equal
and as such, spaces are not neutral.
In contrast, privileged bodies that are uninhibited and unobstructed will take up
physical or aural space with confidence. These bodies extend themselves under the
assumption that they belong in particular settings because their movements within the field
of perception feel natural. Unable to perceive the kinds of obstacles that marked bodies
encounter, privileged bodies approach others assuming that all behavior is innate to a
person’s moral fiber. While the marked body may choose to avoid the corporate setting
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because of its aggressiveness towards them,119 they are perceived to be unambitious or
incapable by the normative figure who believes all bodies experience space as they do. 120
The consciousness of the privileged body is therefore different from its others because it
understands itself as naturally unproblematic.
If the bodies of marked others appear as problematic – or as an object that causes
unease – then the privileged person can justify and feel entitled to even the most extreme
reactions. This is how bodily habits carry forth the hegemonic order and realize systems of
oppression.121 Examples of this are readily seen in biased legal administration and police
brutality towards African American men in the United States. In Judith Butler’s reading of
the Rodney King beating she discusses how the perception of African American men as
dangerous, worth less, and requiring control, led to the “phantasmic production of
‘intention’ that was put upon King’s frozen body.”122 Although King lay unmoving in the
street as he was violently struck, he was understood as likely to endanger and therefore
deserving of the blows he received. The faculties through which King was perceived made
him visible in a particular way whereby what is known and believed makes the figure
visible fixed with meaning. Through this frame, King is seen a priori as an agent of
violence, and as such, his self-defense is interpreted as violent expression. Conversely, the
movements of privileged bodies are more often than not given credence when their actions
are perceived under the hegemonic horizon and hence, the verdict of the King case
determined the four officers “not guilty.” The discursive representation of the violent Black
man was re-inscribed through the bodies of the police officers who created a violent
performance of perpetrator and victim, and the hegemonic order was re-established through
the phantasmic production of “intention” that was circulated throughout the media.
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Thus far, I have presented a view of the privileged habit body as an important player
in the reproduction of systems of oppression. Bodies take on cultural habits of perception
because their movements are informed by the hegemonic horizon. Under this horizon, the
ideal determines the confines of what normative is as a measure against which bodies are
judged. The hegemonic horizon is a phantasm because it disappears in order to present the
figure to us and leads us to believe we see the figure through the natural setting of our
thoughts. This, in effect, conceals the hegemonic influence on our perception, which has
taught us how to see the figure as it is presented to us already loaded with meaning. This
perceptual framework sediments in the body to produce habitual perception that is biased
in accordance with the hegemonic order.
Our perceptual habits carry a fortifying relationship with our habitual reactions that
further obscures our ability to locate the ways our habitual faculties are being structured.
As discussed, habitual reactions are pre-reflective but not bodily reflex, as they are
responses unique to each encounter. These reactions are also based upon our learned
perception of the figure and therefore, what the hegemonic order determines they are to
our bodies. While privileged bodies extend with confidence and the expectation of ease
because they encounter fewer obstacles, marked bodies extend with caution or avoid
certain spaces altogether to avoid hostility and unease. The privileged body, unable to
perceive the multitude of obstacles presented to other bodies, understands the other as
morally worth less than their unproblematic selves. Based on their habitual perception of
marked bodies as problematic or potentially problematic, normative bodies can justify
extreme reactions that are pre-reflective or even conscious because they are perceived to
be worthy of credence. The performance of those reactions re-inscribes and re-establishes
the hegemonic power relations of bodies and does little to make the phantasmic perceptual
framework visible.
As I have discussed, our pre-reflective ways of being in the world are premised on
two distinct yet interrelated habits of the body: habitual perception and habitual bodily
response. These two functions nourish each other to create bodies that carry forward
hegemonic structures into the world as habit. While habit bodies extend into the world prereflectively, they are not necessarily unchangeable or unchanging. I turn now to Ngo’s
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discussion on the theoretical concepts of habit versus sedimentation to locate agency and
responsibility within the overlapping space of conscious and non-conscious being.
Ultimately, my intention is to un-monumentalize privileged bodies.

Sedimentation and Habit
The construction of perceptual habit is reliant upon a process of cumulative
learning, whereby each transposable event sediments in the body a new layer of
understanding. The information gathered builds in the body “an historical record of
experience, context, emotions, taboos and desires” that can be called upon to perform
future actions.123 Sedimentation is not a conceptual understanding through which I am able
to stitch together images or other mental perceptions of my surroundings. My surroundings
are familiar to me because “I hold “in my hands” or “in my legs” its principal distances
and directions, and only if a multitude of threads run out toward it from my body.”124 I
hold in my legs the number of paces to the dresser and in my hands the grasp I use for my
keys. The perceptual acquisition of my surroundings presents to me my consciousness, and
in doing so, it structures my understanding of the world in relation to my personal horizons.
Habit bodies are formed based upon a particular body’s understanding of itself in the world,
which means that my body is constantly learning how to perceive a world that is not
understood as the same by everybody. This is how an individual’s body schema takes
shape, as a correlate structure of their perceived world which then comes to determine how
we perceive the world.
In The Habits of Racism, Helen Ngo discusses the tension between sedimentation
and habit regarding their utility for future action. She argues that while the metaphor of
sedimentation is useful for describing the “settling in” of body habit, it also implies “a
relative inertia or passivity” in regards to future-looking.125 Sedimentation is restrictive in
the sense that it brings us no further than the descriptive histories that accumulate and
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ground the past in our bodies. A focus on sedimentation then is a focus on a past that is
heavy, geologically solidified, and inert in the body.126 Viewing the body as a sedimented
being is perhaps a difficult approach for understanding the body’s capabilities of “I can”
mainly because it overly determines the body’s possibilities.
Habit, in contrast, employs the motor capabilities that make up the body schema to
launch us forward and influence which new skills my body can acquire. The habit body
evaluates the outer world that it perceives through sensing that is learned and transposable.
My evaluation with each movement is an understanding of my body as capable or incapable
of interacting with some objects and desiring some objects more than others. MerleauPonty explains this procedure through the example of acquiring dance skills, whereby the
new skill of dance draws upon the already acquired movements of walking and running.127
This progression of motility means I can – I sense I can – acquire the skill of dance based
on the skills my body schema already holds and makes available to me. This also influences
the translation of the new skill into my body schema, such as a ballet dancer and a street
dancer might adapt to the style of breakdance differently.128 The habit body gives me a
sense of what is possible based on what I sense to be my existing capabilities, but it is
always open to acquiring new sedimentations that alter past habits.
The relationship between sedimentation and habit is not one of direct
correspondence. Merleau-Ponty makes clear that habits do not directly draw upon hardened
layers of sedimentation, as habits are formed and maintained through a process that
requires constant reworking of our movements to express “the energy of our present
consciousness.”129 While sedimented layers are ever-present in the body, habits require the
work of holding them “in my hands” and “in my legs.” What is presented to the body in
the moment is evaluated by the perceiving body as it negotiates within the various horizons
that nourish its understanding of its past and its future prospects. The skills that the body
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then applies emerge from its sedimentations as a pre-reflective event, but the body must be
discerning based on its future-looking intentions. This is to say that if a trained ballerina
takes up breakdance her bodily comportment must do away with the balletic style of arm
and leg extensions but keep her power and flexibility. This is a process of bodily knowing
that is pre-reflective, but as she develops her habitual movements, they can be consciously
reflected upon. This reflection can come in the form of a teacher or peers who assess her
performance as part of the process through which she applies their instruction to actively
hone her craft. The task of transposition, therefore, inhabits the overlapping space of
conscious and non-conscious being, the space in which our body conjures the accord
between “what we aim at and what is given, between the intention and the realization.”130
I bring attention to Ngo’s insights on the relationship between habit and
sedimentation because I am concerned with problematizing the ways that privileged bodies
take up space. Seen from the perspective of sedimentation, the privileged body is
determined to be a figure that perpetually recreates the status quo. However, understanding
privileged bodies as habitually maintaining the status quo by actively holding habits brings
the responsibility of interrogating their perceptual frameworks back to them. As Ngo
argues, this implication undermines their ability to do nothing and fallback on blaming
marked bodies or the hegemonic structures they can claim are coercing their behavior.131
With this in mind, it is also always the case that the expectation of responsibility needs to
consider the heterogeneous make-up of bodies in relation to the normative measure. Being
aware of one’s body as the implied third term of the object-horizon structure is necessary
to reflect upon the ways that bodies are complex in their ability to take up privilege in some
spaces and not others. Our task of taking responsibility for our habits is then, as unique as
the bodily horizons that inform our habitual perception and response.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented a reading of the habit body as a vehicle for being
in the world. Our bodies in the world allow us to perceive and are therefore essential to
attaining consciousness. The quality of that consciousness is predicated upon the many
horizons in which we perceive space, objects and ourselves, relationally. These horizons
are influenced by hegemonic beliefs that structure our relations but appear to us as the
natural setting of our thoughts. When the learned-ness of our perceptual framework alludes
us, we understand the figure – who appears to us loaded with meaning – as being innately
represented. This is how privileged bodies, who do not experience the same obstacles as
marked bodies, perceive others to be problematic and deserving of oppressive or biased
response. The ways in which we perceive figures and our responses to them become
habitual as we perform them. What is at stake in this process is that bodies become
correlates of oppressive systems and as such their actions re-instate the status quo.
In addition to discussing the habit body as a vehicle for maintaining hegemonic
order, I have also conferred alongside Ngo that habits of bodies are open to change. While
the habit body caries sedimentations of past experiences that it can draw upon, it discerns
which sedimentations it will use based on its immediate circumstances and intentions and
future aspirations. This means that the habit body is not condemned to repeat patterns of
biased perception and response, provided their habits are given reflection and interrogation.
To take responsibility for our habitual modes of being in the world requires us to be aware
that bodily relations to space are not equal and space is not neural. How we conduct
ourselves in space is relational to the figures around us under our own unique personal
horizons. We must therefore develop a mode of self-reflexivity that speaks to the
particularities of the bodily horizons that inform our habit bodies.
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Chapter Two: The Settler Habit Body
Introduction
In this chapter, I bring the lens of the habit body to investigate the efficacy of settler
bodies for performing decolonization. I discuss case studies that are concerned with the
contentious issues of settler-Indigenous relations. I apply and contextualise key terms
derived from phenomenology, metaphysics, and affect theory (anchorage points,
perspective, ontological expansiveness, and pressure points) to read and describe
settlerness. My overarching aim in this chapter is to demonstrate how to shift from the
theoretical work of habituation into an embodied perspective of settlerness in 21st century
Canada.
This chapter builds upon the work of Eva Mackey because her ethnographic
research with settlers is descriptive and conceptual and therefore provides a “sweaty” basis
for analysing the settler habit body.132 Focusing on land rights conflicts in Canada and the
US, Mackey investigates “settler certainty,” which she describes as the ontological
certainty of settler entitlement to lands that is based on the myth of solo settler
sovereignty.133 This myth is kept alive over generations and involves narratives that herald
the progressiveness and necessity of settlement and the hard-fought wins of settlers.
According to Mackey, the arguments settlers use to oppose Indigenous land rights seem to
be the only ones available to them, perhaps because they are premised upon “long-standing
and unquestioned ontologies and epistemologies.”134 She asserts that such ontoepistemological arguments are deep-seated, persistent, flexibly applicable over time and in
various contexts, and developed over centuries to produce the self-evident certainty of

entitlement.135 The specificities of these justifications rely upon contrived understandings
of Indigenous lifeways, which are regarded as “inferior, undeserving and unacceptable,”
and Indigenous land claims, which are thought to be “unreasonable, unnatural and
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dangerous.”136 The arguments that prop up the right to settlement conjure the nurturing
relationships between land acquisition and the calumny of Aboriginal nations.
For Mackey, the lineage of colonialism has merged the epistemological work of
ideology with administrative, policing, and legal structural and material efforts to solidify
a settled form of property relations. These relations are frequently referred to by settlers as
the expected order that has been, and therefore always should be. Re-iterated over the
course of centuries, these moments of referral are expressions of “settled expectations,”
wherein “fantasies of entitlement” are present as axiomatic assumptions of settler
peoples.137 Mackey argues that the axiomatic assumptions of settlers act as “cognitive
prisons” that need to be unsettled in order for them to take up the task of re-imagining how
they can be otherwise and bring about equitable land relations.138 She also argues that
because colonization is a material process, decolonization must also be a material process
that includes repatriation.139 However, in order for settlers to be able to “imagine the
possibilities of such material change and conceptual re-imagining,” they will have to
undergo what Mackey refers to as an “epistemological shift” towards a stance of settler

uncertainty and openness, as a starting point to practise and imagine otherwise.”140
In the first section of this chapter, I seek to complicate Mackey’s assertion that an
epistemological shift is an efficacious strategy for decolonization. I argue that
contemporary settlement is not a structure that begins from the mental faculties of the
settler. While their epistemological slant may give the settler justification for their
entitlement, it is their bodies that are responsible for performing the tasks of settlement.
The relationship between how the settler intellectually justifies their entitlement and how
their bodies carry out the tasks of settlement is inextricably linked but, as I will discuss,

carnal knowing is the settler’s first knowing. Settlement is therefore not as much a
cognitive prison as it is a material world in which settler bodies are enmeshed.
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Drawing briefly upon Shannon Sullivan, Mackey considers ontological expansiveness
as a philosophical basis that “underpins both the strategy and rationale for the self -ascribed
entitlement to conquer the world.”141 Ontological expansiveness is a way of being in the
world for privileged bodies, who extend with the attitude that all spaces are and should be
open to their presence because they possess superior knowledge. Mackey’s focus on
ontological expansiveness positions it as an intellectual way of knowing the world that
settlers use to justify their rights to dominate negotiations regarding land relations, based
on their perception that they know more and know better than their sovereign partners. I
elaborate on Mackey’s discussion using Sullivan’s work to explore how ontological
expansiveness is bound up with the habitual perceptual and response faculties of the settler
habit body, whereby their knowing more or better is a way that their body knows the world.
In drawing attention to the integral function that being in the world provides for making
the settler body, I aim to give a more nuanced argument for the necessity of material
decolonization.
In the second section of this chapter, I take up Mackey’s assertion that the axiomatic
assumptions of settlers’ certainty need to be unsettled to open the settler to material
decolonization. I build upon my discussion in part one, which represents the
epistemological paradigm of the settler as inextricably linked to the sedimentations in their
body, to determine that unsettling their certainty requires interrupting their habitual
faculties. Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s concept of anchorage points, I unpack the
differences between interruptions to settler certainty that impede decolonizing action and
those that are required. I conclude that settlers must be anchored in some way in
colonization in order for them to become decolonizing.
The final section of this chapter expands upon my claim that the structure of settlement
that is habitual in the settler body is useful for the work of decolonization. I work with
Ahmed’s insights concerning lines of orientation to show that traversing lines of settlement
orients settlers by way of normative pressures. These pressures are familiar to the settler
body as ways of knowing the world. Difficult encounters for the settler introduce the
feeling of new pressures that threaten their ways of knowing because they carry the
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potential to reveal knowing as also not-knowing. I argue that to turn towards these
challenges is to face up to accepting that the onto-epistemological perspective of settlers is
situated. To engage with such confrontations is not an exercise of intellectually accepting
this assertion, it is an exercise of practising resiliency during the event of feeling ruptured.
Ultimately, this chapter argues that in order for decolonizing strategies to be successful,
they need to work with the intricacies of the settler habit body.

Living Settlement
In her discussions on Western epistemological frameworks, Mackey argues that the
ontological certainty of settlers is based on epistemologies of mastery. In this framework,
the acquisition of knowledge garners power and determines who is the authority. This is to
say that if I can claim to know more than anyone else, then I can claim to know what is
best for all. Such claims secure knowledge and protect it from being diminished by way of
interrogation or reform. In addition to being an accumulative project of knowing more,
epistemology is also social, which means that knowing is a general cognitive ideal that is
hierarchical and ascribes to normative ways of knowing.142 Colonialism has always sought
to subsume Indigenous worldviews into Western – national – frameworks that claim
themselves to be superior.143 The seemingly self-evident superiority of settlers is bolstered
by claims of knowing more and knowing better, and it ensures their certainty of entitlement
to lands.
To focus on the mental aspects of knowing disregards the embodied-ness of
subjectivity and the constitutive function our senses provide for our knowing. To know
ourselves as superior is not just an intellectual knowing, but a sensing endeavor that allows
us to feel and become conscious of our superiority. Early colonialism, for example, did not
accumulate knowledge of lands and people only by way of ideas or mental imagery.
Colonialism in Canada was built upon traversing and mapping lands, trading with people,
and generally immersing settler bodies in the world. Colonialism is a material structure in
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which settler bodies move about to work, play, and generally live their everyday lives. For
modern settlers, each perceptual extension they make is an interaction with the physical
landscapes, administrative and legal systems, and social domain that they perceive in
accordance with horizons that are hegemonic. Their immediate field of presence, how they
sense within their situation, is what forms their consciousness of being. As I discuss in
chapter one, horizons determine how we apprehend figures by giving us a perceptual
framework to evaluate them, overdetermine them, and dictate the nature of our relationship
to them. The habitual perceptions and responses of settlers provide them with a sense of
superiority over Aboriginal peoples. This social order permeates settlers’ extensions into
space and bolsters their understanding of themselves as inhabiting an “omniscient position”
that claims itself to be above Indigenous sovereignty.144 The entitlement to know, or to
express one’s knowing thus requires a feeling of certainty that settlers acquire from
habitually taking up space as specialists of knowing. The ontological certainty of settlers
is therefore bound up with bodily performances.
I turn now to Sullivan’s work on ontological expansiveness because I see it as
purposeful for bringing the cognitive knowing that Mackey suggests impedes
performances of material decolonization, to the settler habit body. While Sullivan writes
in the tradition of American pragmatism and not phenomenology her work is descriptive,
whereby social transactions are taken to reveal the unconscious habits of whiteness. While
Mackey turns to Sullivan to argue that the model of ontological expansiveness has been
the philosophical basis for the epistemological legacies we have inherited, I see Sullivan’s
work to be saying more about how those philosophies are experienced and reified.
Ontological expansiveness is defined as the tendency for people with social
privilege to assume that all spaces are and should be available for extending oneself
unproblematically.145 These spaces can be geographical, within which one’s body moves
around the space, or spaces where their movement is a figurative expression, such as
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linguistic, artistic, or economic presence.146 Ontological expansiveness as it is performed
by early colonizers emerged from a particular set of wilderness narratives and terra nullius
arguments. 147 Lands that were thought to be uninhabited because they were not developed
in the eyes of the colonizer were assumed to be available to those most qualified to
implement the settlement project.
Settlement at present is a structure that does not require settlers to acknowledge
these narratives, which they may even perceive to be ridiculous and unfair. Current national
attitudes towards colonization, such as those displayed in official apologies, position
colonialism in Canada as a past event, as a way to show contemporary settlement as an
advancement.148 However, Mackey has found that settlers recall these stories when they
feel their rights are threatened, to strengthen their “fantasies of entitlement.” She defines
these fantasies as built upon a logic that is “socially embedded, unconscious expectations
of how the world will work;” This logic is “relied upon to reaffirm social locations,
perceptions and benefits of privilege that have been legitimized through repeated
experiences across lifetimes and generations.”149 What I find notable in Mackey’s account
is not that settlers are telling a story that they learned as if it is an indisputable logical
explanation. More problematically, their fantasies have become real and legitimate to them
through repeated experiences that precede their lifetime but carry through their living
settlement.
Ontological expansiveness can be found when settlers tend towards performances
of epistemological domination in instances of land relations. In these scenarios, the settler
who believes they know more defines a problem that impacts Indigenous peoples and then
determines the solution without any self-reflection on the situatedness of their perspective
and its limitations for forming equitable outcomes. Mackey’s ethnographic work analyses
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such events against ideological assumptions that stabilize settler certainty. In one scenario,
the Caldwell First Nations was met with resistance during negotiations to purchase
agricultural land in Chatham-Kent, Ontario. The Chatham-Kent Community Network
(CKCN), which is comprised of settlers, argued that “providing Indians with such good
agricultural land in Chatham-Kent was a waste.”150 Underpinning their assumptions were
“normative judgements about the inferiority of Indigenous peoples” that are often used to
“bolster the sense of entitlement to superintend Indigenous peoples.”151 Mackey found that
settlers’ comments on the matter were suggestive of Lockean ideals concerning labor and
the superiority of “improving labor,” which they initially felt the Caldwell were not capable
of nor intending to accomplish. Some of their statements expressed concern that the
Caldwell would let the land fall fallow and swampy, to return it to the state of nature.
Mackey argues that these assumptions echo Locke’s conceptualization that “people who
exist in “a state of nature” are not seen to have rational societies and governance.” 152
Settlers began to focus on the issue of land drainage, and they became concerned that the
Caldwell would follow their own rules and not comply with provincial regulations or work
with the community. These issues continued to be a source of distress for the community,
even though the Caldwell clearly stated their willingness to work with the local community
and form an agreement with the municipal government, on several occasions.
The strong reactions voiced by the community in Chatham-Kent were indicative of
their insecurities regarding control. One man named James stated his doubt regarding what
he perceived to be a juristic imbalance:
E[va]: In the case of drainage, wouldn’t the reserve and the municipality make some
kind of agreement?
J[ames]: Who enforces it? If a reserve and a municipality reach an agreement, and
the municipality violates that agreement, the natives can go to the provincial
government and say “They’re not living up to their agreement” – and force them to
live up to it! But there’s nobody to force the natives...There’s no clause that says if
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the natives don’t negotiate on good faith “we’ll come in and impose a settlement.”
So, there’s no threat to the natives, but there’s certainly a threat to the
municipality.153
Mackey finds in this and other concerns raised by settlers that their source of insecurity
was not the drainage issue but shifting relations of power and authority. While the Caldwell
First Nation’s Chief Larry Johnson states in his letter to the Chatham-Kent community that
they were willing to negotiate and compromise, he also pointed out that the Caldwell are a
separate government with authority over their land.154 The basis on which control was
being allotted shifted. Settlers initially resorted to historically rooted narratives concerning
their superior farming knowledge and abilities and doubled down on this claim when they
defined and pressed the problem of drainage. They became increasingly uncertain when
they found their claims to superiority were no longer substantial enough to superintend the
Caldwell.
The example of the Caldwell First Nation land purchase dispute exemplifies how
settlers tend to perform epistemological domination by attempting to control the situation
without any self-reflection on the situatedness of their perspective and its limitations for
forming equitable outcomes. I refer to the perspective of the settler as “situated” because
the settler body perceives and responds in accordance with the particularities of their
individual horizons. Under these conditions, their relationship to Indigenous peoples is
overdetermined by the hegemonic horizon which works to instill hierarchies. The settler’s
certainty that they know and therefore should decide for others appears to them as a natural
state of being because the horizon that issues their sense of superiority disappears in the
moment they perceive the figure.
The perspectives of settler bodies can thus be differentiated from the perspectives
of Indigenous bodies, not only because their bodies perceive each other relationally under
a hegemonic horizon, but also because Indigenous cosmologies and worldviews are not
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necessarily ascribable to Euro-western philosophies.155 Epistemological domination is
therefore not merely a problem of settlers assuming they know more, but that their ontoepistemological frames for understanding the world are superior to Indigenous ways of
knowing. David Garneau has called the wielding of knowledge in power relations “the
colonial attitude,” which he defines as “a drive to see, to traverse, to know, to translate (to
make equivalent), to own, and to exploit.”156 The claim to settlement is based on the entire
historical trajectory of living colonialism through which settlers can claim to be the knower
over the known, a self-proclaimed stance of total mastery. 157
The sense of ontological expansiveness that underpins epistemological domination
does not always present itself in the form of blatantly racist historical narratives that see
Indigenous peoples as incapable. In Decolonization is Not a Metaphor, Eve Tuck and K.
Wayne Yang discuss their term, “settler moves to innocence,” which they define as a series
of “strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the settler of feelings of guilt or
responsibility without giving up land or power or privilege, without having to change much
at all.”158 These strategies, which find the settler claiming their innocence to reconcile their
guilt and complicity and reframe settler futurity, appear in six themes. The first theme is
“settler nativism,” wherein “settlers locate or invent a long-lost ancestor who is rumored
to have had “Indian blood,” and they use this claim to mark themselves as blameless in the
attempted eradications of Indigenous peoples.”159 This move to innocence allows settlers
to expand into spaces under the assumption that they can deflect their settler identity.160
Settler nativism gives the settler a sense of superior power because they can move between

While many Indigenous scholars have shown incompatibility, see in particular Metis scholar Zoe Todd’ “Ontology is
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spaces as either a settler or a settler who is biologically akin to Indigenous peoples and also
as a morally evolved settler who is invested through ancestry in being an ally.
The second theme is “settler adoption fantasies,” or fantasies in which the settler
“becomes without becoming” [Indigenous].161 Such moves to innocence find the settler
adopting Indigenous practices and knowledge to take the place of the other. Adoption
fantasies mostly “refer to those narratives in the settler colonial imagination in which the
Native (understanding that he is becoming extinct) hands over his land, his claim to the
land, his very Indian-ness to the settler for safe-keeping.”162 The disintegration of
Indigenous futurity is romanticized in this fantasy as a way to bolster settler futurity, which
is repainted as a heroic effort. Sara Ahmed describes this theme as she sees it in the movie
Dances with Wolves,
to the point of being able to dance their dances...the white man in this example is
able to “to become without becoming”...He alone is transformed through his
encounter with the Sioux, while they remain the mechanism for his transformation.
He becomes the authentic knower while they remain what is to be known and
consumed, and spit out again, as good Indians who confirm the white man’s
position as hero of the story...the Sioux remain objects, while Kevin Costner is able
to go anywhere and be anything.163
This second strategy allows the settler to become enlightened by knowing the other, which
substantiates their position as an authentic knower over the known. Through the adoption
fantasy, the settler garners their sense of superiority by way of the implied heroic efforts
and the specialized knowledge they acquire, which equips them to become the safe keeper
of lands.
The third theme is “colonial equivocation,” whereby differentiated experiences of
oppression are referred to as colonization. This claim maintains that “we are all colonized”
in some way – by the patriarchy, by capitalism – in which case none of us are settlers.
Vocalizations such as multiculturalism display this theme and are detrimental to
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decolonization because they “ambiguously avoid engaging with settler colonialism; they
are ambivalent about minority/people of color/colonized Others as settlers; they are cryptic
about Indigenous land rights in spaces inhabited by people of color.”164 This strategic move
to innocence allows settlers to feel that they are directly invested in eradicating the strife
of others, which they identify as comparable to their own, even though their claims to being
colonized do more to obscure the importance of Indigenous sovereignty and benefit their
status as beneficiaries of treaty relations. Colonial equivocation facilitates the liberal notion
of equality, through which settlers can feel confident to move about as if spaces are devoid
of social hierarchies.
The fourth move to innocence that Tuck and Yang identify is termed “free your
mind and the rest will follow.” This strategic program asserts the importance of
decolonizing the mind by pursuing critical consciousness. The focus of this approach is to
enhance the knowing of the settler, by way of education and self-reflexive critique of settler
epistemology. Tuck and Yang argue that such approaches are not sufficient for
decolonization because they “allow conscientization to stand in for the more uncomfortable
task of relinquishing stolen land.”165 The gap that these authors identify, between
epistemological interrogation and material action put towards decolonization, is precisely
what I aim to tackle in this thesis by emphasizing habit construction in settler bodies as an
inextricable link between bodily performance and epistemological stance. Tuck and Yang
point to this disconnect when they state, “Until stolen land is relinquished, critical
consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler colonialism. So, we
respectfully disagree with George Clinton and Funkadelic (1970) and En Vogue (1992)
when they assert that if you “free your mind, the rest (your ass) will follow.”166 I take from
Tuck and Yang’s viewpoint that decolonizing action generally is not a system of oppression
that is solved with a one size fits all strategy – what is suitable for George Clinton and the
others mentioned is not suitable for Indigenous decolonization – which is why colonial
equivocation is detrimental to instilling change. But coming back to the strategy of
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conscientization, it is a form of ontological expansiveness because it arms the settler with
a knowledgeable discourse of hyper criticality from which they can find a sense of moral
righteousness and confidence to take up space with their knowing. Scenarios where white
people witness racism against people of color and then proceed to explain structural racism
to the racialized individual, exemplify instances where the privileged overextend their
criticality with confidence. In such cases, the feeling that one knows and knows better
provides the impetus for expansiveness, under the assumption that “helping” is
unproblematic.
The fifth strategy is what Tuck and Yang refer to as “At risk-ing / Asterisk-ing
Indigenous peoples.” This move to innocence is concerned with “the ways in which
Indigenous peoples are counted, codified, represented, and included/disincluded by
educational researchers and other social science researchers.”167 The visibility of
Indigenous peoples in research and pedagogy represents them in two ways. The first is as
“at risk” peoples, wherein they are described as “on the verge of extinction, culturally and
economically bereft, engaged or soon-to-be engaged in self-destructive behaviors which
can interrupt their school careers and seamless absorption into the economy.”168 These
representations are present despite it being well known that the educational success of
Indigenous students requires instruction in their languages and not in English, teachers who
are familiar with their communities, and curricula that are designed to be “compelling,
relevant, inspiring and meaningful” to their lives.169
Simultaneously, this research renders Indigenous communities asterisk peoples,
“meaning they are represented by an asterisk in large and crucial data sets, many of which
are conducted to inform public policy that impacts our/their lives.”170 This strategy of
representation positions Indigenous peoples in the margins of public discourse and
conceals the erasure of Indigenous presence within the particularities of public policy. Tuck
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and Yang argue that this strategy is a move to innocence because it is “a token gesture, an
inclusion and an enclosure of Native people into the politics of equity” while it does not
properly represent “Indigenous politics, educational concerns and epistemologies.”171
These kinds of renderings comprise a core of knowing Indigenous peoples that is
assimilative because it evaluates Indigenous sovereignty, ways of knowing, and ways of
being within the onto-epistemological structure of settlement. Although this knowledge
does not accurately represent the capabilities of Indigenous peoples, settlers can refer to
them when substantiating their sense of superiority and their entitlement to superintend
Indigenous peoples.
The final theme that Tuck and Yang discuss as a settler move to innocence is what
they term “re-occupation and urban homesteading” which takes up the occupy movement
and urban re-settling as an expression of re-occupation on stolen land. While the occupy
movement was a welcome resistance strategy for the economically marginalized, its
program elucidated the incommensurability between the political agendas of “re-occupy”
and “decolonize.”172 Although the movement was anti-capitalist, it was also pro-colonial,
as the authors state: “That is, the ideal of “redistribution of wealth” camouflages how much
of that wealth is land, Native land. In Occupy, the “99%” is invoked as a deserving
supermajority, in contrast to the unearned wealth of the “1%.” It renders Indigenous
peoples (a 0.9% ‘super-minority’) completely invisible and absorbed, just an asterisk group
to be subsumed into the legion of occupiers.”173 As a strategy that re-distributes wealth
amongst settlers with no regard for the stolen lands that created that wealth, the occupy
movement was a re-inscription of colonialism that obscured Indigenous land rights.
Another occupation movement that conjures similar outcomes is urban
homesteading, which “is the practice of re-settling urban land in the fashion of self-styled
pioneers in a mythical frontier.”174 “Tradition” is emphasized in homesteading, and as such
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this lifestyle often involves re-colonizing tactics, such as: claiming “Indian-like spirituality
while evading Indigenous sovereignty and the modern presence of actual urban Native
peoples;” “Claiming land for the Commons and asserting consensus as the rule of the
Commons, [which] erases existing, prior, and future Native land rights, decolonial
leadership, and forms of self-government.”175 Occupy movements are settler moves to
innocence because they are anti-capitalist and thus appear to be beneficial for addressing
the oppression of Indigenous peoples.
The overarching concern of these six moves to innocence finds the settler extending
into space under the assumption that they are doing good things, whilst they evade land
repatriation and other forms of material decolonization that directly affect their lives.
Claiming innocence in these ways, which settlers take to be productive and morally sound,
is more than an intellectual stance on social justice. Most importantly, these moves to
innocence require settler bodies to take up space based on their claims to superior
knowledge. This is to say that settlers perform these particular strategies because they seek
to address socio-political problems, and they believe that they possess the know-how to
accomplish the task. This becomes epistemological domination because settlers are not
aware that their perspective on the matter is situated, and in assuming they know enough
and know best how to confront the problem, they over-determine the scope of solutions.
The settler body, believing itself to be all-knowing, can take up space in settler
society with confidence. This is not to imply that all settlers navigate uninhibited and
unobstructed, but their movements are not impeded in the same ways that Indigenous
peoples experience. Settlers extend themselves under the assumption that they belong in
particular settings because their movements within their field of perception feel natural.
Unable to perceive the kinds of obstacles that Indigenous bodies encounter, the settler
assumes that all liberal behavior is innate to a person’s moral fiber. While Indigenous
peoples might choose to avoid particular settings that are hostile to them or be pushed into
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particular spaces by the state’s neglect, their circumstances are perceived to be their own
moral failings by the settler who believes all bodies experience space as they do.176
To objectivize space in this manner is a condition of ontological expansiveness.
According to Sullivan, ontological expansiveness is an unconscious habit performed by
those with white class privilege, and it “operates by denying the spatiality of situation.”177
Within this line of thinking, spatiality is assumed to be objective and thus neutral by the
privileged figure. However, lived spatiality is where intending bodies move about in
relation to other figures and horizons that give spatiality “racial, ethnic, and linguistic
meaning.”178 The settler learns to extend with mastery and control by denying spatialized
power relations, or more specifically, the privilege they acquire through these structures.
While the settler can sense the power dynamics enough to perceive their knowing as
superior, they understand their right to take up space as a specialist, as a natural event that
should also be apparent to others. Each extension reifies the settler’s privilege spatially and
sediments in them the reassurance that they belong everywhere.
While ontological expansiveness in Sullivan’s work is associated with whiteness
specifically, it defines a privileged bodily comportment with the world that impacts the
lives of others. Which bodies are privileged and which are not is determined by the
perceptive qualities of the body and the place in which the body extends. As discussed,
settler bodies are privileged in Canada because their interactions in the world carry out the
colonizing endeavor of the state, which gives their extensions a particular comportment.
These interactions include everyday involvement in the Canadian economy – benefitting
from it and laboring in it – which is largely dependent and built upon stolen lands, to further
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one’s life and financial gain. This is not to diminish the fact that the marked bodies of
settlers do experience systemic oppression in Canadian society. I only wish to draw
attention to a line of delineation that distinguishes the maltreatment of Indigenous peoples
from the marked bodies of settlers. As I have discussed, Indigenous peoples have been and
are managed and policed differently than marked settlers because they are treaty holders
and therefore possess legitimate sovereignties that threaten the state’s claim to sole
dominion. The bodily comportment of settlers extend the settlement endeavor, meaning, as
Kyle Powys White has argued, it carries forward the “desire, conscious and tacit, to erase
Indigenous peoples.”179 These desires do not necessarily appear to the settler as Indigenous
destruction, but reveal themselves as innocuous hopes for settler futurity.180 The settler
body knows pre-reflectively how to strive to make it happen by engaging in the everyday
events of settlement, which are simultaneously inequitable to Indigenous peoples.
Thus far, I have attempted to show that colonization in Canada is not premised on
the cognitive prisons or axiomatic assumptions that comprise settler knowing. Settlers are
certain of their place in colonial Canada from living settlement, by occupying space with
their performances of epistemological domination which become pre-reflective habits. To
know is to traverse, to sense, and to interact with other figures, objects, and landscapes.
For the contemporary settler, the embodied project of colonialism is laid out before them,
sensible and available to establish their conscious understanding of their place in the world.
Settlement is, therefore, not just an epistemological project that can be thwarted by thinking
differently. It has been turned into material forms that are external to the settler and that
their bodies learn to pre-reflectively navigate so that colonization becomes sedimented in
their bodies. The necessity of material decolonization is therefore an integral component
for settlers to understand their capacity for decolonization.
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Anchorage, Perspective, and Disorientation
Mackey’s ethnographic account of settler entitlement discusses the disorientation
that settlers feel when their rights to land are diminished or threatened.181 Their response
is to defend their lineage of presence – their hard work and struggle on the lands – and to
behave in accordance with their lineage of knowing what to argue to remain a settler that
keeps settlement alive. While Mackey argues that socially embedded fantasies of
entitlement are merely expectations that have become common-sense only to settlers and

are, therefore, a perspective that requires constant maintenance to acquire material form,182
I have discussed that these arguments are a perspective that is inextricably linked to the
sedimentations and habitual faculties of the settler. Challenges to this perspective are thus
impediments to the settler habit body, not just the intellectual arguments that they wield.
This is perhaps why Mackey describes the affect that these confrontations have on the
settler as being a felt experience, during which the settler utilizes the long-held arguments
of settlement to push back against their “state of vertigo.”183
Mackey’s use of the term “vertigo” echoes Merleau-Ponty’s assertion that bodies
who are perceptually unmoored from the continuity that facilitates their habitual states find
themselves in a state of vertigo and nausea.184 To define and explain the importance of
continuity, I turn to Merleau-Ponty’s ideas on anchorage points, which are the moorings
through which bodies stabilize their worldviews and garner their certainty.185 Anchorage
points are conceptual locations in the world at which subjects “gear in” by way of a spatial
contract between their body and the world. These points include the vertical and horizontal
positionings of door frames, windows and other objects that help us adjust our bodily
movements to accomplish tasks. When I walk across the front hall to get my keys, my body

Mackey, Unsettled. See Mackey’s ethnographic work on settlement disputes.
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takes up the directions given to me by the objects in the room, which allow me to know
how far up to raise my grasp, or what “up” is more generally. Objects in space and their
spatial relations to each other provide for the perceiving body points of reference with
which the body expresses its motility. By adjusting my bodily movements to these
anchorage points, my phenomenal body gears into the world to have a maximal grip on the
situation.
When bodies become accustomed to moving about in a field of perception, they take
up what Merleau-Ponty calls “a spatial level” within space. A spatial level is a point at
which “maximum clarity in perception and action specifies a perceptual ground, a
background for [my] life, a general milieu for the coexistence of [my] body and the
world.”186 An individual possesses the world with his/her body as they gear into that spatial
level at the intersection of their motor intentions and perceptual field.187 Each new spatial
level that is encountered requires the subject to re-attain their sense of familiarity through
bodily spatiality, by changing his/her approach to the environment. Such re-orientations
inherently involve new comportments of the body to adjust accordingly.
When I walk into my front hall to grasp my keys, the dresser and its perceptible
qualities line up with the floor, the door frame and the other features of the room. The
relationality of these objects to one another creates for my body a directional frame that I
grasp by adjusting my comportment: my reach, my steps to approach, and my balance. My
body navigates this room with ease because it has sedimented the knowledge required to
be amongst the objects that frame its movements and that also allow my phenomenal body
to be open to new situations and reshaping. Finding anchorage in this perceptual frame is
always necessary for my body to become grounded, grasp or “possess” the world, so it can
move about and extend with confidence and freedom of action.188
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As we move through the world, we perceive it through the frame of our individual
perspective. Anchorage points are involved in establishing our perspective because they
act as a ground or a horizon against which we perceive and move around. As MerleauPonty explains, the act of perceiving is how we make meaning of what we perceive:
The coast flows by before our eyes if we keep our eyes fixed upon the ship’s railing,
while the boat moves when we stare at the coast. Of two luminous points in the
dark, one immobile and the other moving, the one that we focus upon seems to be
moving. The cloud flies over the steeple and the river flows beneath the bridge
when we stare at the cloud or the river. The steeple falls through the sky and the
bridge slides over the congealed river when we stare at the steeple or the bridge.
What gives the status “moving object” to one part of the field, and the status
“background” to another is the manner in which we establish our relations to it
through the act of looking.189
When we perceive, the eye is never a neutral object that records moving objects. The eye
is directed to see some objects as moving and some as not depending on which anchorage
points ground the body in the spectacle. As a component of our object-horizon visual
structure, anchorage points must blur from view to make an object visible. Anchorage
points are thus “not an explicit perception,” meaning, “they are not presented directly to
our perception, they circumvent it and haunt it through a pre-reflective operation whose
results appear to us as ready-made.”190 Much like a phantasmic horizon that pre-determines
our relationships to others, anchorage points help us differentiate within our visual field
that which we value as the figure and as the background.191
Anchorage points are what give us a feeling of security and stability to move about in
the world with confidence. The settler may find certainty to perform epistemological
domination when their perspective becomes anchored in ways that organize the world in
accordance with their sense of entitlement. The Caldwell land purchase perhaps
exemplifies how settlers’ anchorage in the situation defined the value of the disputed
object. The community saw the land through their individual and collective perspectives,
which I have argued can be differentiated from Indigenous perspectives. From this
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positionality, the value of the land was in its potential for farming. As discussed, Mackey
points to this as a Lockean conceptualization of land. The land was not, for example, valued
as an object that held potential for cultivating more equitable settler-Indigenous land
relations. The former interpretation of land that settlers focused on reified their certainty of
entitlement, whereas the latter threatened this certainty because it meant acknowledging
sovereign partners who do not need superintending. Mackey points out that entitlement is
the expected order for settlers because they believe it has been and therefore, always should
be the natural state of affairs. The way that the Chatham-Kent community took up
anchorage in the situation, maintained continuity between spatial levels to preserve their
certainty.
As we move through the world, we move through different spatial levels and take them
up in accordance with other anchorage points that are presented to us. Our perception of
these anchorage points is always the exercise of adjusting to and gearing into a new level.
Merleau-Ponty argues that the body’s adaptivity to new levels is necessary for allowing it
to move with confidence from one spatial level to the next. When continuity is broken,
such as when one enters a funhouse of oddly shaped mirrors, the body becomes disoriented.
In such cases, the tasks one might find simple, such as walking around a corner or across a
room, become difficult. The body must learn to move differently, and the confidence of
bodily extension must be rebuilt to accommodate the situation. Finding confidence of
movement in the funhouse happens because our bodies explore it and in exploring it, the
body begins to know itself as capable of navigating that particular maze of mirrors.
Drawing upon the visual experiments of George Stratton, Merleau-Ponty explains
directionality as something that is not objective but found by the body. During these
experiments, subjects who wear mirror inversion glasses for uninterrupted periods of time
begin to sense a different placement of up from down based on their need to align their
motility with their visual field.192 Objects and spatial relations that the body senses as
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anchorage do not signal any real direction until our bodies make it real by finding their way
around; as Merleau-Ponty explains, “What counts for the orientation of the spectacle is not
my body, such as it in fact exists, as a thing in objective space, but rather my body as a
system of possible actions, a virtual body whose phenomenal “place” is defined by its task
and by its situation. My body is wherever it has something to do.”193 What we understand
to be up and down is based on what we perceive to be up and down and how our bodies
find it. The exercise of wearing mirror inversion glasses induces a state of discontinuity
when moving between spatial levels. Similarly, when we find our way around the
funhouse, we are not moving in accordance with objective cardinal directions. When we
walk “around” a slanted corner or “up” a slope and “diagonally down” a twisted staircase
we determine what “around,” “up,” and “diagonally down” are in relation to the series of
previous spatial levels we have moved through. Each new spatial level is encountered as
sequential from the last, and we carry into the new spatial level the sedimented corporal
knowledge of previous levels. Our bodies become adept at moving between levels by
finding continuity between them. While our initial experiences in the funhouse are
disorienting, spending uninterrupted time in the house allows our bodies to sediment new
ways of navigating the world, until we eventually find continuity.
As discussed, habitual perception and response emerges from the body’s sedimented
experiences in the world that become pre-reflective. Taking our bodies from the work of
walking to dancing, or from ballet to break dancing, are vague examples of where we can
see our bodies draw upon our sedimentations. Our motility is intricate and nuanced; our
sedimentations are drawn upon with every move we make, whereby some skills are
selected while others are left behind. The movements of dance are comprised of much
smaller and more intricate expressions of our body’s agility that simultaneously call upon
the flex of muscles and movement of bones in complex coordination. But most importantly,
these expressions happen in relation to space and to the very ground upon which the dancer
dances, for we cannot feel ourselves kick up or to the left unless we perceive what down
and right is.
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Anchorage points become the perceptual frame in which we understand our bodies.
They are the stabilizers through which the body’s perception and response faculties become
habitual. This is to say that once inversion glasses are placed on the eyes, it interrupts prereflective habits and the body must re-learn how to move about its environment. Moving
from a spatial level that the body knows – prior to inversion glasses where the dresser, the
keys and the door are as I know them – to a spatial level that is inverted induces
disorientation because there is a break in perceptual continuity. If I enter a front hall that is
inverted, my body is no longer sure about how to get to my keys and leave the house.
If we understand settlers’ epistemological stance to be inextricably linked to the
habitual faculties of the settler habit body, then settlers feel epistemological shifts. But
more importantly, what does this feeling do for making settlers decolonial? Seen through
the lens of the habit body, the axiomatic assumptions of settlers are more than a fallacious
tale they tell each other, it is a feeling of well-being in their world. The experience of
disorder that occurs when perceptual continuity is broken is not merely a thinking
experience or a cognitive awareness of difference. As Merleau-Ponty argues, disorientation
is the vital “experience of vertigo and nausea, which is the consciousness of, and the horror
caused by, our contingency.”194 As I have discussed, the stability of our consciousness is
dependent upon being able to perceive one moment from the next, but as a moment that is
imminent yet related to our past and future aspirations. To become aware of how contingent
the world is, creates uncertainty, yet it is also the contingency of the world that allows for
change. Our aspirations are based on what we perceive is possible, or more specifically,
our aspirations are formed at the intersection of our perception and our motility, which are
inherently intertwined.
The breaking of continuity is, therefore sensed by the settler, and it conjures a threat
that is deeper than challenging the logic of an intellectual argument. When settlers’
property and expectant futures are suddenly threatened, they feel “endangered, uncertain
and angry.”195 The unmooring causes them to latch onto what can make them feel secure,
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not necessarily what can be argued.196 To unmoor the settler elicits a change in their bodily
comportment but not one that is likely to open them to new ways of sensing and acting. It
tends to cause them to reach for certainty, to find continuity at any cost because they are
under duress. At present, finding continuity is always available for them because the settler
world offers more certainty for colonizing reaches than decolonizing reaches. In effect,
making the settler uncertain works against opening them up to imagining material
decolonization because it provokes them to claim colonialism as secure ground.
I would also like to make clear that breaking perceptual continuity is not the same as
interrupting the stream, which I have described alongside Ahmed as being a disruption.
While it is true that I will stop or hesitate before I begin to gear into my now inverted world,
I am feeling the pressure of threatening circumstances which is different from feeling the
pressure of norms. Under this pressure, I feel unmoored because my body is between what
it knows and what it does not yet know; I am being forced to re-learn myself in relation to
the inverted space. This is a problematic strategy for the project of decolonization because
as I have argued, settlers are embedded in a material world of colonization in which they
know themselves. A world that is decolonial is not available for the settler to inhabit and
re-learn themselves; they must participate in actively creating that world. For settlers to be
decolonizing, they need to be moored – on some level – to the norms that comprise the
material and phenomenal structure that they resist; to gear into this world is to know what
is different from it and why it needs to change. The work of decolonization is in the
changing of settler habits, in making a different comportment that modifies which
sedimentations are employed and which are left behind. To change our comportment
requires us to perceive the existing structure differently so our bodies gear into the world
differently and change the phenomenal relation. This is how settlers’ bodies become
decolonized as correlates to their surroundings, which become decolonized worlds.

Mackey, Unsettled, 11. Settlers’ fantasies of entitlement, as Mackey explains, are emergent from “repetitive
embedding and realizing of settler assertions of certainty and entitlement,” which entails the retelling of stories that are
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and turned them into laws.” These rationales have a pattern of logic that are upheld by being socially embedded, not by
being fact but by being an expectation that is carried out through settler bodies; living settlement is how these fantasies
become true for the settler.
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In this section, I have argued that challenges to settlers’ long-held arguments are felt
because they are inextricably linked to their body’s sedimentations and habitual faculties.
Unsettling their paradigms of knowing means unmooring their habitual faculties, which is
not only an intellectual shift but a sensation of vertigo and nausea. Unmooring is sensed
by the settler, and it conjures a threat that is deeper than challenging the logic of an
intellectual argument because it makes them feel endangered. Unmooring thus causes
settlers to latch onto what can make them feel secure and thus works against the prospects
of decolonization because it provokes them towards reclaiming settlement. Although stops
and interruptions are involved in the process of breaking the continuity, unmooring is not
productive for performing decolonization because it eliminates the work of decolonization
that is necessary to change the habits of settlers.

Pressures and Turns
The lines of settlement that bodies traverse are not seamless insular tunnels that make
them impervious to the pressures of decisions. The repetitions of norms that we perform
are applied to our choices and intentions and inform the movements and comportments we
make. It does not follow that because we are gifted the lineage of colonialism settlers must
reproduce it. The lines of colonialism are dotted with decisions and inclinations. Each of
these dots are what Ahmed refers to as “stress points:” the points at which norms provide
a source of stress, a “social pressure to follow a certain course, to live a certain life, and
even to reproduce that life.”197 The accumulation of these stress points orients us to face
the same way along the collective trajectory.
To traverse lines of orientation, such as settlement, is to navigate in repetition the
particulars of the outside world. Ahmed writes, “depending on which way one turns,” the
objects and world presented to us changes.198 Which way we turn determines which objects
are in reach. Accessible arrangements of objects allow us to know ourselves; therefore,
when settlers experience stress points and adjust or turn in accordance with them, the
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objects that appear become useful for understanding their conscious being as correlative to
the normative structures. What does not come into view cannot influence the construction
of settler consciousness. Lines of colonization face us away from the happenings that
disrupt the collective trajectory when they turn us towards goals. As I have discussed, being
taught to turn away from what is difficult makes determinant who is friend and who is
stranger. Turning away in repetition sediments in our bodies whose lives matter.
The lines towards our collective goal become an investment because they require the
work of enduring the pressure of normativity. This pressure becomes familiar to our bodies,
leaving impressions that change its surface. We feel this pressure as the reassurance of
certainty; certainty that we will be directed by pressure. Our propensity to turn away from
what we have been taught to ignore is a turning towards the familiarity that is the sensation
of being pressed into becoming a settler. The ways that we perceive become habitual from
navigating relationally to this pressure. The body’s comportment deals with this pressure
by making itself small underneath it or shrugging and nodding off its adversaries to protect
it. Turning towards what is difficult provides a pressure as well, but one that is unfamiliar.
To turn towards causes a disruption, and the sensation of that disruption is always presented
by a normative pressure that calls the event a disruption. These are the moments in which
settlers must choose which burden of pressure they take up.
I bring attention to these moments because it is overly simplistic to paint the
experience of settler life as being unconstrained. Norms and epistemological slants are not
experienced by settlers unproblematically. Their bodies are not free of the pressures to be
settler, to achieve in the system of settlement by being productive. Interruptions to this
productivity may come in the form of difficult encounters that threaten to rupture our
knowing. These are the instances when we feel we must turn away in order to make our
knowing make sense. The phenomenological implications for the settler who believes they
know more and know better is an experience of contradiction. For our knowing to feel
superior, we must also be conscious that there are other ways of knowing that we perceive
to be lesser. Settlement in Canada claims its superiority on the assumption that its authority
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is unproblematic.199 The events that challenge our knowing are those that reveal settlement
to be problematic. These moments are the ones that call into question our norms, which
imply a direction that is shared. Situations like these are phenomenal because they indicate
the limits of our intellectual understanding. To turn away from grappling with what is
difficult requires that we not know how the systems that benefit us are negatively afflicting
others. Our becoming settler thus requires that we perform our knowing in ways that
require knowing to not-know.200 To turn towards and engage with such confrontations is
not an exercise of intellectually accepting this assertion; it is an exercise of practicing
resiliency in the event of feeling ruptured.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have considered the intricacies of the settler habit body for
understanding decolonization. Settlement needs to be understood as a structure that works
through settler bodies, in which sedimentations of how to settle become habitual. The
epistemological certainty and ontological expansiveness of the settler are not the source
of settlement, but the reasoning and justification that is inextricable to what the settler
body knows. The settler understands themselves to be omniscient because they take up
this position in space and with each extension their reassurance that they belong
everywhere becomes sedimented. Events that challenge settler entitlement are therefore
not merely challenges to their intellectual arguments as much as they are challenges to
their habit bodies, which feel the affects as disorientation. Changes to the continuity of
settler’s perceptual anchorage are not useful for decolonization because they cause the
settler to reclaim settlement. The work of decolonization must be done by settler bodies
who feel the structure they resist so they can sense what decolonization is. The work of
decolonization is thus the work of changing settlers’ habitual movements that seek out
the certainty and familiarity of normative pressure. Learning how to be resilient and turn
towards while being in the colonial world is learning to be decolonial.

See introduction: “The underlying ideological assumption and legal attitude on which English colonialism in Canada
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Chapter Three: “Seeing With,” Across the Rows
Introduction
This chapter is concerned with confronting the problematic question of how settlers
can restructure their habitual faculties and “see with” Indigenous peoples to form more
equitable land relations. I employ key terms from critical phenomenologists Alia Al-Saji
and Sara Ahmed (“seeing with,” critical-ethical vision, and stress points) to unpack the
processes and affective implications of opening settlers’ habitual faculties. I draw from
settler colonial studies scholars and Indigenous thinkers, philosophers and scholars to
demonstrate the compatibility of Indigenous philosophies of treaty (Guswentha) and the
phenomenological approach of “seeing with”. I conclude by offering some insights into the
motivations that might bring settlers to do the difficult work of decolonization.
In A Phenomenology of Critical-Ethical Vision, Alia Al-Saji contemplates the
efficacy of seeing with others for reshaping vision. Building upon Merleau-Ponty and
Henri Bergson, she revisits the claim that vision is inherently objectifying and categorizing
to ask “can vision see differently? That is, can vision accommodate a critical reflection of
its own conditions and an ethical attitude to otherness of what it sees?” 201 For Al-Saji,
objectifying vision is a habitual and sedimented way of seeing and learning. In which case,
a critical vision – one that sees differently – must discern habits of objectified seeing and
the social structures that contextualize and motivate their formation—what Gail Weiss has
called their “social reference.”202 I draw upon Al-Saji’s work in this chapter and bring her
ideas regarding critical-ethical vision in conversation with Ahmed’s lines of orientation to
think through the hesitations and turns that the settler habit body is asked to make during
performances of decolonization.
While this chapter gives its focus to vision, seeing is discussed as one component
of the sensing body that works in accordance with others. Vision and the limits of its
capacity produces objectifying vision when it is taken to be the way of knowing, or as a
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way of knowing isolated from the other affective faculties of the settler body. Al-Saji’s
concept of critical vision is concerned with opening the habits of objectifying vision by
seeing through the affective field – what is sensed – rather than just relying on the field of
vision. The affective field is the integration of our sensing faculties, of which vision is
merely a part. This would allow us to see “conditions that make visibility and
objectification possible—conditions which are diacritical, social, historical and
material.”203 Critical vision in this form would make apparent what is phantasmically
present in the moment of seeing, what brings us to understand the figure and our
relationship to them.
However, as Al-Saji also points out, critical vision that is not also ethical is
insufficient for seeing differently. She argues,
The critical without the ethical remains detached from lived experience and risks
falling back into the trap of totalizing vision—the desire to make all that is unseen
visible in order to know and possess it. This is the equivalent of making visible the
socially constituted subject-positions in which we find ourselves, but forgetting the
diversity of subjectivities acting, responding and resisting therein (thus reducing
the thickness of those subjectivities to their subject-positions).204
To make critical vision ethical, the seer must see themselves as implicated in these systems
and dimensions, complicitly or otherwise. To see critically the conditions in which the
other lives is not as sufficient as also seeing our involvement in how those conditions arise
and are reproduced. Conversely, having an ethical vision that is not also critical risks
obscuring the differentiations of our experiences within power structures and histories,
which leads us to believe our sufferings and successes are unrelated to those of the other.
The integration of critical and ethical is thus required for seeing differently.
In the first section of this chapter, I bring together Al-Saji’s work on critical-ethical
vision and Sara Ahmed’s ideas on stress points to problematize the settler habit body. I
argue that taking up the project of “seeing with” others is advantageous for settler
performances of decolonization. To “see with” allows the settler to critically interrogate
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their perspective to reshape the way that they see. It also allows the settler possibilities for
ethically engaging in this work by reflecting on their complicity in the matters of
colonialism. I also discuss what seeing critically-ethically might mean for restructuring
what settlers know, whereby they shift from relating to others as the knower into relating
as a knower amongst others.
In part two of this chapter, I discuss the usefulness of “seeing with” for
performances of decolonization in regard to the original agreements of treaty. I look to the
Two Row Wampum – or the Guswentha – as an example of how settlers could maintain
treaty. Wampum, as it relates to settlement, represents a series of treaties developed during
the 17th century between the Haudenosaunee (the Five Nations of the Iroquois) and the
Dutch settlers in New Netherland (New York).205 More specifically, wampum provides a
strategy for equitable relations and respectful coordination concerning the maintenance of
partnerships. I argue that the habitual faculties of the settler body make it efficacious for a
decolonizing program that is guided by the principals of the Guswentha because habit
construction is adaptable. If relations are attended to in ways that create habits of “seeing
with” then decolonization is possible.206 I bring in Al-Saji’s point that social structures and
the lived experiences of individuals are interrelated concerning the institution of norms.
This means that decolonizing settler bodies and decolonizing instituted structures is an
inherently conjoined project. Turning toward thus induces alterations to what is normative,
in which case, the project of decolonization can initiate a shift from the uncomfortable
work of enduring oscillating pressures during inassimilable events until the repetition of
these acts is felt as the normative pressure. I conclude that turning towards and performing
acts of decolonization can be taken on by the body as a habitual way of being in the world,
and to reshape normative structures that, in turn, encourage the settler to be decolonial.
Ultimately, this chapter argues that setter conduct in settler-Indigenous relations is
habitual and is, therefore, adaptable and open to restructuring. My argument in part one
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picks up and investigates Eva Mackey’s question, “how can we listen to others when we
already know?”207 My discussion in part two aims to take this investigation from
understanding how settlers can do differently into the more concerning question of why
settlers would take up the task of decolonizing work.

Objectifying Vision and the Affect of Hesitation
Objectifying vision emerges when the conditions of what we see become invisible.
In previous chapters, I have discussed the body as the unimplied third term in the objecthorizon structure of seeing. I have summarized Merleau-Ponty’s work to explain that the
objects we gaze upon are seen by way of diacritical dimensions that makes the object
visible to us – the plays of light and shadow that our vision works with to differentiate
objects from their surroundings. I have also discussed the social structures – or norms –
that have become institutionalized and that phantasmically disappear at the moment they
shape our vision. But the physiognomy of my body – my two eyes in the front of my head
– also contribute to the formation of my perspective because I cannot see from every
perspective at once and I also cannot see myself seeing. 208 My gaze casts itself into objects,
which solicit my intentions, and they become objects for my gaze because I try to make
sense of them. The situatedness of my body as a pair of eyes that exist in a particular point
in space is forgotten along with the disappearing horizons that determine how and what I
see. I thus take the object to be fully present to me and in its “natural” state.209 This selferasure contributes to the ways that privileged bodies see others as morally deficient as
opposed to navigating systems of coercion, and it is what prohibits our habits of seeing to
appear uncomplicated and “natural.”
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What is lost to vision is the relationality of my body to the object that I gaze upon.
My social positionality, my physical positionality in space and the scope of my vision all
shape my ability to perceive and are forgotten during the encounter. My relationship to the
object is severed, and I understand myself as unrelated to it. To see an object is thus to not
see the conditions in which it is seen. As I have also discussed, this is why the
epistemological domination performed by settlers is a certainty of knowing that is also a
knowing not to know; for the settler to understand their knowing, it must appear against
ways of knowing that make their knowing appear to them as superior.
While these conditions may elude us when our sight defines the object, we can still
sense their presence. Our eyes may not be able to see themselves seeing, but our other
faculties of sensing are implicitly present with our bodies. We can see others responding
to our seeing, which makes us aware of ourselves as seers, or as Merleau-Ponty states, “
through other eyes we are for ourselves fully visible.”210 What disappears so we can see
the figure is what Merleau-Ponty refers to as “felt in our experience as no more than a
certain lack.”211 In not having enough of the frame visible, in having parts of it lacking –
invisible or obscured – we come to see a particular object by seeing it in a particular way.
This invisible yet felt experience is exemplified in settlers’ performances of
epistemological domination, wherein they claim space as specialists of knowing who are
most equipped to address settler-Indigenous land issues. During these performances, the
conditions that make Indigenous presence appear to settlers as inferior, disappears in the
moment of perception. But the settler’s sense of superiority, their sense of their body’s “I
can,” is inherently tied to their sense that Indigenous peoples cannot because they perceive
under horizons of institutionalized hierarchies. What is forgotten during the encounter are
the social, historical, material, and diacritical conditions that have become settlers’
sedimented understandings of settler-Indigenous relations, but these elements are always
present as affect because they are implicit in forming perception.
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For settlers to know themselves as the knower over the known, they must also know
to not know, or more pointedly, to not heed the affective weight of what they can feel but
cannot see. This is to say that when settlers endure points of pressure, their choice to endure
under the weight of what is familiar requires them to ignore the pressure that makes the
familiar strange or that threatens their sense of familiarity. The ways in which they perceive
Indigenous presence is habitual but so is their inclination to stay the normative course, as
turning away becomes habitual. Turning away during encounters thus shapes what settlers
understand the practical possibilities to be; the “I can” of their body who knows itself in
the world.
In her discussions on critical-ethical vision, Al-Saji understands realms of visuality
as overlapping with affectivity during objectifying vision. Al-Saji explains this overlap as,
“The realm of visible objectivity is, [then,] narrower than that of affectivity.”212 While the
dimensions that imbue the object with their qualities become invisible to vision, they are
not lost to our senses:
With respect to the world, systems of diacritical difference, the histories of
oppression and social structures that allow meaning to appear are seen only insofar
as they are reduced to the attributes of objects. While these dimensions work in us
and affect us, invisibly and unconsciously, allowing us to see, it is by means of their
elision that the realm of visible objectivity is defined. This is to say that such
dimensions – whether material, diacritical, historical, or social, whether bodily or
worldly – have affective but not “objective existence.213
What is affectively present, shapes what we see and gives meaning to the figure, and this
meaning is understood to be innate to them. This is how meaning comes to appear in the
first place as part of the situation that our bodies make by being in the world. What we see
is not all that we can sense. In which case, the dimensions that are elided can be found by
looking to affection.
I understand this overlap of affect and visible objectivity to be present at the
moment of initial interpellation when the settler encounters what is difficult. These events
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would include any situation in which the settler feels the instability of their sense of
entitlement, such as being told they are not welcome in particular spaces. In moments such
as these, the settler is confronted with complications that threaten the stability of their
settlement narratives, which secure their right to be everywhere and know everything. The
settler body feels the vulnerability of its sense of normalcy, to rupture. The oscillations of
pressures that accompany the visual event signify the space in between sedimentation and
habitual response. It is in this space that the settler body might leave its habitual perception
unquestioned and shift into defending their entitlement, to close down the feeling of
discomfort or fear. This is the seamless performance that Al-Saji argues can be opened up
if we attentively employ hesitation before we act.
In considering what constitutes critical vision, Al-Saji discusses the tactic of
hesitation as an affective strategy for interrupting the unconscious flow from habitual
perception to response. She argues that hesitation “creates an opening in habits and makes
them visible for themselves and within the world.”214 By delaying habitual reaction,
hesitation “open[s] the way from affectivity to memory.”215 The body, in this moment, has
the time to feel and remember, and in doing so does not automatically repeat the past but
remembers it. As Al-Saji argues, “Through affect, the body waits before acting; it has the
time not only to perceive, but also to remember. It is in this way that affect symbolizes, for
Bergson, a body’s hold on time, its duration. For to feel is to no longer to repeat the past
automatically, but to imagine and remember it.”216 While the settler may not be able to see
all that is hidden, they can “marginally” encounter “the surprised revelation of a blind spot
in vision, of invisibles to which vision is indebted.” 217 This is how habit becomes visible
in memory so it can be reflected upon.
Visualizing habit, as Al-Saji suggests is not completely dissimilar to the example
of dance I have discussed alongside Helen Ngo and Merleau-Ponty. Visualizing the habits
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of taking up dance can come in the form of a teacher or peers who assess a dancer’s
performance – their habits of movement – as part of the process through which the dancer
hones their craft. In this case, the dancer must “see with” her teacher and peers and merge
their perspective with what she senses to be her own, in order to successfully integrate new
moves and sedimentations. However, unlike the settler, the dancer comes to this task aware
that she does not know how to adapt her body to the new style of dance. The dancer then
takes the perspectives of others to be insightful and valuable; she does not assume she
knows more or better. She is also willingly adapting her body to new rules because she
senses the value of the dance form. In which case, the dancer seeks not to hesitate but to
repeat the past, to sediment in her body the new form of movement. The dancer’s process
exemplifies habit change that is possible were settlers to “see with” their sovereign
partners. However, settler bodies are immersed in the structure of settlement, which shapes
their habitual faculties in ways that devalue Indigenous perspectives. Hesitation is therefore
valuable for the settler because it creates an opening through which they can marginally
encounter their habits.
Epistemological domination is such a habit, a tendency for settlers to behave as if
they know best how to take actions when problems arise. In Unsettled Expectations,
Mackey recounts an instance where a settler community member from Seneca Falls, New
York, took a risk and attempted to connect with the Cayuga Nation without reproducing
the domineering dynamics of settled relations. The local towns of Seneca Falls, Union
Springs and Ithaca had expressed hostility towards the Cayuga because of their land claim,
which had been tied up in legalities since 1980. Julie Uticone became concerned about the
situation in 1999, which she saw as rapidly escalating.218 In response to the growing
climate of hate, Uticone reached out to the Cayuga Nation to find out what she should do,
instead of turning away from the situation or deciding amongst other settlers what should
be done. According to Mackey, Julie “took the risk to reach out to cross the historical
binary boundaries and distance that often exists between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
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people.”219 Julie did not assume the right to determine the best course of action without
consulting with the Cayuga, nor did she assume she knew how to support them. When her
connection to the Cayuga was eventually established, new alliances were formed. Julie
and her husband founded the group SHARE (Strengthening Haudenosaunee American
Relations through Education), which was openly supported by Bernadette “Birdie” Hill,
Heron Clan Mother of the Cayuga Nation.
Julie’s hesitation was born out of her awareness that the habitual tendencies of
settlers to “help” Indigenous peoples are often paternalistic and ethnocentric. But how she
acted in the moment, how she extended her body, came with feelings of uncertainty
regarding how she might jeopardize her membership in her community and how she might
be received by the Cayuga. These are the pressures that Julie felt when she stopped in the
stream to consult with the Cayuga on where and how to turn. Hesitation is where the body
has time to perceive and remember, to no longer repeat the past, but it is a sensed
experience. What became visible to Julie was that she had a blind spot, which she felt as
her inability to know what to do and how to proceed without reproducing colonizing
relations. Julie established new relations because her body found them in the world. The
shift from hesitation to memory is therefore not just a cognitive adjustment, but a way of
relearning the world with our bodies.
According to Al-Saji, memory must take two implicated forms for us to visualize
habits. The first is memory of the present – “the diacritical and seemingly formal conditions
of actual visibility – the structures, social and otherwise, that configure what we see.”220
The second is the memory of the past, including a memory of what was never present for
our vision – “the habitualities and sedimentations, the instituted ways of seeing and vertical
historicity, that make my vision what it is in the present.” Critical memory that is limited
to remembering only the present misses the material and historical grounds of vision and
how “a way of seeing, and of making visible comes to be instituted as a system of visibility
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that counts.”221 What is habitual in settler bodies has a past. This past is the blind spot in
their vision where the partiality and situatedness of their vision and its social reference to
a particular order of difference and meaning, become the norm.222 Al-Saji argues that while
critical vision does not make this blind spot visible explicitly, it appears marginally and
affectively by revealing “coincidence” to be a “constituted” and “anticipating” way of
seeing.223 Hesitation thus makes space for affectivity to move into critical memory, to
reveal one’s seeing as situated.
The role of critical memory is beneficial for opening the seam between
sedimentation and habitual faculties because it reworks pre-reflective inclinations. Critical
memory, as Al-Saji describes it, has three purposes as it pertains to opening habit.
First, it is the memory of habituation; it serves to contextualize and historicize our
habits, to show them as habits. Secondly, the memory itself is already a
destabilization of habit; it replaces the performance of habit. And, thirdly, memory
connects habit to its dynamic temporal and affective ground, to the duration that
makes habit possible, even while it is being continually reconfigured by habits
acquired. This duration is more than any given habit; it is, in Merleau-Ponty’s
terms, the pre-personal dimension of embodiment that permits not only habit
formation, but also change.224
Hesitating that leads to critical memory then, fractures habituality by re-presenting the
perceived naturalness of habit as habit, by getting in the way and interrupting the body’s
pre-reflective tendencies, and by revealing habits to be temporally constructed. In regard
to the reliance habit has on duration, this perhaps speaks of the moments of agency where
one has the ability to alter their habits. Just as Ahmed recognizes stress points along lines
of orientation as points where turning is possible, conceptualizing habits as formed over
time allows one to grasp the malleability of their habit formation. In other words, duration
is required to make habits and thus make new habits to alter our pre-reflective inclinations.
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The project of critical vision, as described thus far, is a vision that sees social
structures in generalizing terms; in ways that are “oddly unsituated and disembodied.”225
To amend this, Al-Saji asserts that hesitation must also not forget “the heterogeneity of the
ways in which these structures are taken up, lived, repeated and subverted – a heterogeneity
which means that these structures are not monolithic but shift.”226 Seeing critically is not
merely a project of seeing social structures or the history of them, but also how they are
interconnected to one’s positionality and complicity within them. In which case, hesitation
is useful for settlers to see the colonial legacy as implicated in producing their current
conditions, but also as the ways that their complicity recreates their status as beneficiary.
The moment of hesitation, as Al-Saji explains it, is an opening for possibility but
the affective experience of this space is not consistent across bodies. While she describes
it as an “openness to alterity in experiences of waiting, wonder and surprise,” this is not
necessarily the case for privileged bodies.227 Indeed, I do not think this account properly
describes the settler experience. Hesitation for the settler entails making space to see
marginally and affectively, which is a difficult encounter with beginning to know that
which they know to not know. I argue that although hesitation offers settlers possibilities
to see the social structures, diacritical dimensions, and their positionality to their others,
hesitation is the moment when they engage in the discomfort of grappling and negotiating
between turning towards what feels familiar and turning towards what feels uncertain.
These moments are what Al-Saji refers to as an affectivity that feels “powerless,” whereby
openness to alterity is taken up in “an attitude of self-conservation and closure – especially
when it is one’s privileged positionality and the imaginary seamlessness of one’s bodily
capacities that are at stake.”228 She argues that in response, there must be an attentive effort
made to maintain the moment of hesitation and remain in the feeling of powerlessness,
which is generative because it lets in other ways of seeing that challenge our own.
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At this point, I wish to come back to Ahmed’s insights on becoming an obstacle
along communal lines of orientation because it intersects with Al-Saji’s ideas regarding
hesitation. The affective weights they both describe are useful for making tangible that
which cannot initially be objectified. For Al-Saji, hesitation is needed “not only in order to
reveal the play of social structures and diacritical dimensions, but also in order to show
how the weight of multiple pasts, of historicity and habituation, institute and naturalize
these structures while at once fracturing their consistency and stability.”229 For Ahmed,
becoming an obstacle is to become an inconvenience to the stream, to feel the pressure of
the conditions that stop you from stopping, as a tangible thing. What is made tangible can
then be reshaped by turning a different way and forging a new path for bodies to take up.
What they both motion towards is the immersion of bodies in the interplay between one’s
individual lived experience and the structures that become institutionalized. This is where
one feels the weight of having to negotiate the volatile process of becoming certain and the
vulnerability of that certainty to repetitive ruptures. However, these are also the moments
that are fruitful for altering the course of what has been, which could be why the oscillations
of pressures are intense. Hesitating or becoming an obstacle by stopping fractures the
consistency of the stream, whereby what is streaming must build up behind the body who
waits, eventually move around it or follow the new course it forges when it turns towards.
The negotiations that settlers endure when they hesitate are at once productive for
maintaining and reshaping the institutionalization of social structures and diacritical
dimensions. Seeing marginally and affectively itself constitutes a difficult encounter for
the settler, mainly because their sense of superiority is illuminated as hierarchically
constructed with negative implications for Indigenous peoples. What the settler perceives
to be a norm – a direction that is shared – is revealed to be a purposeful illusion for their
benefit. Bringing attention to settlers’ affective scope in the areas where it is wider than
their objective vision reveals their knowing to be partial. But let us not forget that during
this work the settler is not alone, as these tensions are socially structured. He/She/They
is/are presented with difficult encounters because other ways of seeing and knowing
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challenge their expectations and put their sense of entitlement in question. The stream then
becomes oscillating pressures of push and pull when inassimilable events arise.
Inassimilable events are what I have discussed as difficult encounters that
interpolate us affectively. These occurrences are those that we cannot explain using our
instituted system of meaning.230 Al-Saji argues that there are two ways of seeing such
events. The first is by refusing to see them in any other way than through the normative
organization of the field. This is what Merleau-Ponty refers to as a “pathological” response,
whereby the normative schema of objectifying vision is willfully maintained even though
the affectivity cannot be reconciled with the history and sociality of the level. This vision
is unhesitating and seeks to assimilate the seen into its already established ways of
knowing. Moving from level to level in this instance requires no change in habitual
faculties. I understand this pathological vision to be the more certain choice for settlers
who encounter difficult events; the choice that knows to not know.
The second way of seeing inassimilable events is by “seeing with” others. This
requires one to hesitate and allow the event to “insinuate into our vision as the dimension
according to which the visual field is restructured,” which changes how we see.231 Al-Saji
discusses the two ways in which one can “see with.” The first sees others as familiar, but
to whom we are indifferent. This form of “seeing with” risks becoming objectifying vision
because it elides “the lateral dependence of my vision upon others whose affective
influence is appropriated or denied.” Problematically, this “seeing with” serves to render
vision as neutral, impartial and the seen as inassimilable.232 The second form of “seeing
with” draws upon hesitation as an attentive effort to hold open possibilities of seeing
according to the aspects of the field of vision that have become invisible because they are
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subsumed or excluded from what we see.233 This “seeing with” holds the potential for
allowing us to see in ways that correspond to others
“Seeing with” in its second form is what Al-Saji argues makes critical vision
ethical. It is not to see through the eyes of the other, nor dismiss what they see as inferior
to our ways of seeing. “Seeing with” is to comprehend that our own eyes are already other
because they belong to a system of vision in which our quotidian existence with others is
visible and invisible to us.234 To approach our vision with such reflexivity is to recognize
“the obligation of a shared vision,” the maintenance of which is the difficult effort of being
attentive to our co-existence with others.235 This is perhaps the form of “seeing with” found
in the actions of Julie Uticone. Julie was aware that her view of the situation belonged to a
larger structure that typically treated Indigenous sovereignty in paternalistic and
ethnocentric ways. Perhaps when she hesitated, Julie was determined to make an attentive
effort to hold open the possibilities of “seeing with” the Cayuga, who were typically
excluded.
When we hesitate and allow events to insinuate into our vision and alter the way
we see, anchorage inherently plays an important role. To understand our own vision as
implicated in social structures and diacritical dimensions that we have inherited by way of
the colonial legacy is to acknowledge that the sedimentations we have acquired correspond
to the current state of colonialism that we actively take up with our everyday lives. How
we take up anchorage, how we place our self in space, provides a starting point for
affectively investigating what we – and those who came before us – can only marginally
perceive. Instead of pathologically ignoring the affective weight of difficult events by
preserving the perspective of one’s anchorage, settlers can use hesitation to investigate
their anchorage with the intention of purposefully performing its re-arrangement. If we
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bring attention to our affected state when we extend into spaces and place importance on
what our bodies feel when we think we know, we might realize we know more, and we
know better. “Seeing with” is thus a way of seeing that challenges the epistemological
stance of the knower over the known but it offers settlers the opportunity to re-understand
themselves as a knower in co-existence with others.
In this section, I have put Al-Saji’s ideas regarding “seeing with” in conversation
with Ahmed’s concept of stress points to further problematize the settler habit body. I have
discussed the importance of affect during difficult encounters, especially inassimilable
events where the settler must comprehend circumstances that cannot be explained by their
frames of knowing. Performing hesitation attentively during these moments is important
for opening up the habitual faculties of the settler, so they can marginally see the blind spot
in their vision. Their critical vision must also be ethically taken up, meaning, settlers must
face up to the ways that their positionality and complicity are implicated in the social
structures and diacritical dimensions that shape how they see and what this means for their
being beneficiaries of these structures. Maintaining the moment of hesitation in this way is
the difficult and uncomfortable work of enduring the oscillating pressures of powerlessness
and possibility for change. The choices that settlers make, in coordination with their others,
have the potential to maintain the colonial legacy or reshape it.
I have also discussed “seeing with” as a constructive tool for opening the habitual
faculties of the settler. By focusing on the field of affect that is wider than the scope of
their vision, the settler can tap into knowledge that previously went unnoticed or perhaps
ignored. While “seeing with” challenges the settler’s epistemological inclination to
dominate others with their certainty of knowing, it also opens them up to new ways of
knowing that include knowing themselves as a knower amongst others. “Seeing with,” I
argue, is an appropriate way to address Mackey’s concern regarding how settlers can see
when they think they know. However, it still remains that the work of “seeing with” feels
difficult, as it requires enduring the oscillating pressures of uncertainty while new ways of
seeing and being the world become sedimented. Even if settlers acknowledge that they
have the capacity to “see with,” I question what would make them want to take up the
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arduous task of seeing differently. The following section seeks to unpack why settlers
might turn towards the task of grappling with inassimilable events to reshape their habits.

Affect, Motivation, and Change
While this thesis approaches decolonization by problematizing settler bodies,
decolonization is necessarily a joint effort between Indigenous peoples and settlers. I have
sought to integrate Al-Saji’s work, specifically, into this project because it discusses
“seeing with” as a practice that avoids the pitfalls of inassimilable events; mainly, the two
dominating moves of appropriation or denial of other ways of knowing. Instead, “seeing
with” requires “lateral passivity,” which is to remember the affective dependence on
alterity and understand this dependency as “the obligation of a shared vision.”236 But most
importantly, as Al-Saji argues, a shared vision is not a philosophical reflection with an
epistemological beginning, but a shift in visual practices that are “a change at the level of
habits of seeing to interrupt the seamless objectifying representation and the exclusions
this implies.”237 Seeing attentively then requires holding open the moment of hesitation,
feeling the oscillations of pressures, and responding under the affective weight of sensing,
feeling, checking, and questioning.
At this point, I want to turn back to Mackey’s work to illuminate the ways that it
also sees decolonization as action, or as she phrases it, “treaty as a verb.” To perform
decolonization is to perform treaty, and for settlers this means taking responsibility for
upholding the agreements that were made and through which they benefit. Although I have
attempted to complicate Mackey’s insights by arguing that settlers’ obstacles to
decolonization pertain to their body’s “I can” rather than only their epistemological
paradigms, I am merely trying to locate the affective point of possibility which I see as a
viable opening for settlers to begin acquiring new habits of conduct. But to be clear, my
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intention is to provide an argument that emphasizes the need for settlers to perform treaty
as an essential point of departure.
A general model for how settlers can partner and maintain treaty is perhaps best
described by The Covenant Chain, which represents a series of treaties developed during
the 17th century between the Haudenosaunee (the Five Nations of the Iroquois) and the
Dutch settlers in New Netherland (New York). The Covenant Chain is depicted in
Guswentha, or more specifically the Two Row Wampum treaty belt, which shows five
stripes of alternating white and purple rows running parallel along the length of the belt.
At the center of the belt, between the purple rows, are rows of white that represent the space
of relations between people.

Fig. 1: Two replica teaching wampum belts. The bottom belt indicates the alliance between the Six Nations
Haudenosaunee Confederacy – the Mohawks, Senecas, Oneidas, Cayugas, Onondagas, and Tuscaroras – and the British
Crown. The top belt is the Two Row wampum.

There are many interpretations of wampum that discuss the autonomy and the
interrelatedness of the purple rows. Some of which understand the rows to be expressions
of difference, “paths that never converge,” and clear and permanent separations of
nations.238 Other interpretations focus on the three beaded rows between the purple rows,
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which represent the three principals of conduct: friendship, peace, and longevity.239 In
either case, the middle rows are the space in which the relationship is conducted, built over
time and into the future. As the initial Dutch treaty proposal is recorded in the
Haudenosaunee tradition,
You say you are our father and I am your son. We say, We will not be like Father
and Son, but like Brothers. This wampum belt confirms our words. These two rows
will symbolize two paths or two vessels, travelling down the same river together.
One, a birch bark canoe, will be for the Indian people, their laws, their customs and
their ways. The other, a ship, will be for the white people and their laws, their
customs and their ways. We shall each travel the river together, side by side, but in
our boat. Neither of us will make the compulsory laws not interfere in the internal
affairs of the other. Neither of us will try to steer the other’s vessel. The agreement
has been kept by the Iroquois to this date.240
Treaty, as it is conducted through wampum, is not meant to be a paternalist relationship,
but one of respectful autonomy and interdependence. As Susan Hill has argued, without
the three principals that bind the vessels together, “the two vessels could drift apart and
potentially be washed onto the bank (or crash into the rocks). This agreement was meant
to provide security for both sides.”241
Wampum as Daniel Heath Justice describes, is a writing technology used
extensively throughout the Eastern Woodlands of North America.242 He explains that
“wampum functions most significantly – and successfully – when it is in relationship with
a living people who are literate in its meaningful textual traditions” – traditions of
representation in communities and histories – as well as the traditions of wampum belt
production.243 Both aspects of tradition “are constitutive participants in the meaning
making of wampum exchange; they are not simply the medium through which the
exchange takes place.”244 As master storyteller Tehanetorens (Mohawk) describes,
“Wampum strings served as credentials or as a certificate of authority. No Iroquois chief
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would listen to a messenger or pay attention to a report until he received official
information through a runner who carried the proper wampum string or belt. Wampum
guaranteed a message or a promise. Treaties meant nothing unless they were accompanied
by wampum. Belts were given and received at treaties as seals of friendship.”245
I pair in this discussion the Guswentha with Al-Saji’s “seeing with” because I find
in them an intersection that is useful for conceptualizing aspirations for the settler habit
body. The relations that the Guswentha represents are complex in the ways that they
understand the negotiations between autonomy and interdependence to be in flux. This
definition conflicts with Western enlightenment frameworks, which understand “propertybased assumptions about autonomy, freedom and property as boundedness and
separation.”246 As Mackey writes, “Western frameworks conceive of autonomy in terms
of one nation, one community and one singular peoples with clear boundaries and fences
in between: in some ways, autonomy is seen as a kind of property.”247
In contrast, the flexibility of autonomy that the Guswentha understands differs in
its sophisticated focus on being autonomous within tensions of relations. Its attention to
non-fixed ways of understanding autonomy are akin to what Kyle Whyte describes as
collective continuance:
When we zoom in on experience and time, collective continuance refers to an
understanding of existence as living through diverse, constantly changing
relationships with different species, ancestors, future generations, and spiritual and
ecological beings (e.g. water). These relationships are infused with responsibilities.
So, continuance refers to living through constant motion and diversity within a
collective of responsibility-laden relationships.248
Whyte describes this style of relating as one that embraces “migration, motion, fluidity,
vibration, and expansion/contraction,” and thus provides an adaptive capacity and fluidity
that supports moral relationships across durations of diverse conditions.249 Collective
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continuance, as Whyte describes it, is what colonialism seeks to erase, and it does so by
fixing Indigenous mobility and migration for the purposes of settlement and land claims.
As discussed, performances of settlement carried out by settler bodies are habits
that require maintenance and that are therefore open to be re-directed towards different
ends, such as decolonization. It is this adaptive quality that I find to be a complimentary
attribute for rebuilding settler habitual faculties in coordination with the Guswentha. The
concept of the Guswentha requires the task of renewal, or what is referred to as “polishing
the covenant chain.”250 Caring for the chain in this way means we are “aware that the
relationship is not new, that it is not beginning now; it has roots deep in the past and it
changes over time.”251 To polish is to renew what is already there, to actively engage in
flexible ways in a joint project to establish positive relations. The habit body that can bring
itself to perform this type of work is one that is anchored in their row and is aware that
their vision is not their own but a form of vision that is bound up with ways of seeing. It is
also a body that is attentive, aware, and hesitating because it is actively restructuring – or
polishing – its vision while it is learning itself in the rows of peace, friendship and
longevity. The flexibility of this task is to find certainty not in the rigidity of an autonomy
that seeks to fix relations, but in the certainty of trusting our partners during the ebbs and
flows of conditions that are constantly in flux. These are the kinds of equitable relations
that take time to develop and that settlement has sought to damage. But by actively
engaging with this work within the middle Guswentha rows, while utilizing the adaptive
qualities of our habit bodies to “see with”, we can begin to know ourselves differently,
extend with confidence, and start to imagine the possibilities for changing the course of
settlement.
For my final transition, I want to turn towards the difficult question that this thesis
means to address: Why would settlers do this work? Colonization is a line that has been
traversed for centuries, and for individual settlers this means the inheritance of a lineage
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that binds them to other settlers by way of collective labor to keep the path clear.252 The
collective lines of direction that settlers take up are investments in communal hope because
the longer we tread them the harder it is to deviate from the supported journey to get
somewhere.253 This is perhaps why reshaping these lines as we turn different ways is
sensed as heavy and laborious. Turning different ways requires us to engage with feelings
of mourning and loss for a desired future, and the work of cobbling together new support
systems. This endeavor is not an epistemological shift as much as it is an affective
performance of learning to hesitate, “seeing with,” and taking up space differently; all of
which are new ways of being in the world for the privileged body. Resiliency, dedication
and commitment will therefore be vital for settlers to decolonize.
In moments of hesitation, when our bodies are opening to perceive differently and
deciding which way they should turn, the affective work may feel drastic. This is because
the body in that moment is still facing what it stands to lose and how it knows itself. Once
the body has turned towards, its perspective changes and new objects emerge in its
perceptive fields to know itself differently; as Ahmed argues, “Depending on which way
one turns, different worlds might even come into view.”254 Turning is thus effective for
settlers becoming other than decolonizing, and perhaps most importantly because the more
settlers repeat these turns their bodies acquire the shape of decolonization.255 Decolonizing
turns then become performances that the settler body understands as an “I can” possibility.
What eventually becomes familiar is the pressure of decolonizing turns.
Creating the habit of turning towards also alters the structures and dimensions of
institutionalized norms. As discussed, social structures motivate us; they inform our
habitual perception as sedimentations. The relationship between social structures and
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seeing is dialogical, we sense in accordance to these structures but by resisting them or
turning a different way we alter them; Al-Saji describes this process when she writes, “The
circularity between habit and institution, bodies and social horizons, means that vision is
neither mere social construction nor individual accomplishment, but an institution and a
historicity that is always taken up and resumed.”256 Colonization works through settler
bodies, and this is how settlement is maintained as a material structure through which
settlers know themselves as colonizers. But habit does not only recast settler bodies. Habit
also makes the perceived world appear differently, or perhaps re-organized to fit our new
ways of seeing. 257 In which case, restructuring habits will eventually allow us to see new
possibilities and find different meanings and norms of settlement that take precedence over
the need to reify certainty. The pressures of decolonizing turns, once felt as difficult
encounters, may begin to feel normal, and with repetition may, even become habitual. This
is how new structures of settlement can be built, by taking difficult turns and forging new
paths until the quality of normative pressure changes. What then becomes possible for the
settler is new ways of understanding their extensions into space, land relations, and what it
means to polish the Covenant Chain.

Conclusion
This final chapter has attempted to address the problematic question of how settlers
can restructure their habitual faculties to see otherwise than objectifying vision. Alongside
Al-Saji, I have argued that settlers can see affectively, within a critical-ethical vision, to
confront their complicity in colonization and to re-know themselves as a knower amongst
others. I have drawn an intersection between Al-Saji and Ahmed’s tactics of hesitation and
stops to discuss settlement as coercive pressures and what it feels to endure those pressures
while turning towards what is difficult. Negotiating within these pressures is productive
for maintaining and reshaping the institutionalization of social structures and diacritical
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dimensions that bring us to re-producing settlement. To restructure the visual field by
seeing affectively is how settlers can “see with” Indigenous perspectives in ways that avoid
the pitfalls of appropriation or denial.
I have also discussed how seeing affectively is a strategy that is complimentary to
Guswentha and polishing the covenant chain. Bodily habits require maintenance, and as
such they become malleable to new techniques for relating in the world. If settlers were to
take up decolonizing action by polishing and renewing their relations to their sovereign
partners, by giving affective weight to the autonomous and interconnected relationship they
are enmeshed in, they could alter the character of settlement. Ultimately, our habits as
settlers determine our expectations for the future, and as such, incremental changes to our
habits bring different expectations for our futures into view. If we begin the sweaty work
of decolonization, then we become open to new possibilities to express our agency and
responsibly attend to the legacy of colonialism. How we do differently carries the potential
to change why we want to be different.
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